I didn't say anything about implementing the MAC yourself. Someone has to implement it, though -- and no matter who writes the code, HMAC-SHA256 is far more likely to be right and not leaking data via side channels than CBC-MAC is.
The point is that there are already shrink-wrapped AE constructions (like CCM or EAX) that you can pick up off the shelf and use; HMAC designs are more likely to be bespoke.
If you trust the library, sure. But I've found that the same rules apply to crypto libraries as to everything else: Obscure and complicated features are far more likely to be buggy.
No crypto library is ever going to ship with a broken HMAC-SHA256 -- but I can't say the same thing about AES-CCM.
CCM and EAX aren't obscure. AE crypto has been in 3 of the last 4 designs I've had to review. The fourth prompted a recent blog post of mine.
The same goes double for your second point. Yes, if you have to implement the MAC yourself, you clearly want to use HMAC rather than trying to get CBC-MAC right. But if you're in a place where you have to implement your own MAC, you are doomed for a bunch of other reasons. CCM is preferable to HMAC because it's likely you're going to simply be able to change CTR to CCM and have it.