Good point but I believe that the only way to combat that particular edge-case is to use something like the valid_referers directive: https://gist.github.com/jdorfman/6737413
"This isn't about a known attack, but a class of attack that we know from experience is likely to crop up in the future for any type of cross-origin resource load that we allow."
You bring up another good point, but I am not talking about every cross-origin resource here, I am talking about Content-Type: font/ttf, application/x-woff, application/vnd.ms-fontobject & image/svg+xml.
However, it is the sort of thing that creative hackers are good at combining with other capabilities or exploits in order to get at data or code they shouldn't. The trend in web API design is to keep things same-origin by default, and give control to authors over whether they want to give other origins access to their data, because this keeps things secure by default and limits the number of tools that those creative hackers have at their disposal.
Not everyone at Mozilla agrees that this is the right solution. Anne van Kesteren (formerly of Opera, now a Mozilla employee), for example, favors adding a "From-Origin" request header that would remove the need for servers to add Access-Control-* headers in many cases (though it would not provide the same security properties by default):
http://annevankesteren.nl/2011/02/from-origin
http://www.w3.org/TR/2011/WD-from-origin-20110721/
Meanwhile, some Google employees have been major proponents of making things same-origin by default; read the Tab Atkin post linked above for example. This isn't really about sides; it's about constantly trying to find better ways to improve the web without compromising security. I won't claim the current solution is perfect; it's a starting point, that's all.
Thanks for the debate, I learned a lot. =)
I don't expect Microsoft to listen to their customers/users. I used to think Mozilla did but apparently not.
Also note that if you can't convince Microsoft to change this as well, then it doesn't matter too much what Mozilla does (at least for sites that need to support IE).
"Usually we prefer well-reasoned bug reports or emails as apposed to "Fucking fix it" on the HN front page, but we'll take feedback where we find it. :)"
You know just as much as I know that email is dead ;)
Edit: I see you added more to your comment now.
There are a few reasons to require CORS for cross-domain font loads. One is so that you can use fonts that have single-site licenses in a way that satisfies the licensor, by not allowing other sites to use the font too without your authorization. Another is to prevent unintended data leaks where a malicious site can deduce things about a user based on whether that user can load a font from a different site, or based on the contents of that font. This isn't about a known attack, but a class of attack that we know from experience is likely to crop up in the future for any type of cross-origin resource load that we allow.