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Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by conductor on Friday September 27, 2013 @10:13AM (#6457093)
Elcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor [0] can find the decryption keys from the RAM dumps or hibernation files.

The RAM can be accessed using a DMA malware from the GPU/NIC/Intel ME or other devices which have a (micro-)processor and can use DMA [1, just submitted].

[0] - http://www.elcomsoft.com/efdd.html

[1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6457069

Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by tedunangst on Friday September 27, 2013 @10:17AM (#6457114)
Your backdoored DMA capable NIC can also just copy the plaintext out of RAM without futzing around with the key.
Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by dlitz on Friday September 27, 2013 @11:12AM (#6457372)
This isn't just about surreptitiously installing a compromised PCI card into a desktop PC. It affects every machine with a FireWire, Thunderbolt, or PCMCIA/ExpressCard port, i.e. most stolen corporate laptops.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMA_attack

Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by rdl on Friday September 27, 2013 @11:40AM (#6457527)
VT-d addresses this. Standard on most Intel Core processors for a couple years.
Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by tga_d on Friday September 27, 2013 @12:54PM (#6457951)
I've heard that it could address it in theory but hasn't actually been used for that yet. Do you have a source saying it does this by default, or failing that, how to set it up to do that?
Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by sweis on Friday September 27, 2013 @04:39PM (#6459391)
IOMMU with VT-d is present, but not utilized by some major commercial operating systems and hypervisors.

There are also some implementation vulnerabilities in specific OSes which are not yet publicly disclosed.

Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by conductor on Friday September 27, 2013 @10:26AM (#6457149)
Copy the plaintext of what? The password? The encryption programs usually don't keep the password in the RAM longer than required, but the key must be always there.

I just wanted to say that keeping the decryption keys out of RAM and Disks is not that paranoid because there are techniques which allow extraction of data from the RAM: cold boot, ordinary malware/rootkits, DMA malware.

Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by tedunangst on Friday September 27, 2013 @11:48AM (#6457574)
The plaintext of whatever you're encrypting. Presumably you're going to actually use these debug register AES keys to encrypt or decrypt something more interesting.
Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by rdl on Friday September 27, 2013 @01:27PM (#6458211)
The sneaky thing is to do like TreVisor, and I believe the commercial company PrivateCore, to encrypt all memory outside the CPU die (L1/L2, maybe L3?), by pinning the hypervisor and encryption routines to something running inside, and encrypting everything which leaves (and presumably doing some integrity protection). HN user sweis works for PrivateCore; I've talked to them a few times and they seem really interesting, although I think a more conventional HSM makes more sense for some applications, and Intel SGX is going to make the whole thing a lot more interesting in 2-3 years.
Re:TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM by sweis on Friday September 27, 2013 @04:45PM (#6459446)
Here's a video of a malicious PCIe device extracting both plaintext and encrypted main memory: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chvJpEmXvDk