We've hijacked this thread enough by now. Time for us to make our closing arguments and move on. This will be my last post, though I'll read whatever you post in response.

Your last post seemed scattershot to me, but I do want to respond to what I think was a very peculiar argument in your first sentence.

The US isn't forcing anyone to burn hydrocarbons, of course. But a treaty is still important, because many smaller nations will conclude that if the huge emitters aren't going to change, there's no real point in sacrificing themselves (to some extent, this was Australia's rational for rejecting Kyoto).

There's an article in this week's economist about applying prisoner's dilemna to global warming action - where it pays to defect (let other people do the heavy lifting on reducing emissions). If the rest of the world gets it together on global warming, then you'll get a free ride. If the rest of the world doesn't - well then we're all going to hell in a bucket anyway, so why bother with sacrifices? But if everyone acts this way, we'll all be much worse off than if we had cooperated.

The economist article also points out that while defections pay off in single-run games, they don't necessarily pay in repeat games, where subsequent punishment for previous defections may cost more than the benefit of the original defection. In this context, the community of nations who do cooperate may be able to punish defectors severely enough that they prefer to come on board.

I suspect that California is trying to signal to the world that it is cooperating, not defecting, on global warming - by making a very big and public break with national policy. This, along with other policies, is part of the california "brand." While California needs to do more (and an editorial in the SF Chronicle comparing California's policy to New Zealand's shows that we are in no position to get smug), this is no bogus fabrication.