This is simply incorrect. The cash flows involved in an OTC derivative are explicitly stated in the contract itself.
I imagine that the complicitness of the rating agencies in the whole thing never would have even gotten so egregious if most institutions had vanilla instruments on their books that were straight forward to value. OTC derivatives made it very easy to hide finagling...
You imagine incorrectly. Pricing most of these contracts is 8'th grade math given a specific scenario - fancy math comes into play only in estimating the probabilities of each scenario. In principle, the pricing formula is this:
price = P(housing goes down) x BIG LOSS + P(housing goes up) x MODERATE GAIN
That's the price, regardless of whether it's a straightforward vanilla mortgage or a fancy synthetic CDO.
The ratings agencies, banks and government all assigned a very low value to P(housing goes down). Using vanilla instruments doesn't change this basic calculation.Other than that, I agree. It was the lack of a central clearing house for the derivatives -which would have allowed issuers to determine counter party risks and price it properly -that was the failing. But that's a human error. There's no need whatsoever to blame the securities themselves.
There is no way that the markets would have fallen that far and that fast if most participants, and the rating agencies, had the capacity to accurately and directly determine how much risk they and their counterparties had.
I imagine that the complicitness of the rating agencies in the whole thing never would have even gotten so egregious if most institutions had vanilla instruments on their books that were straight forward to value. OTC derivatives made it very easy to hide finagling and create an environment where rating agencies feel comfortable playing the tit-for-tat game with banks because they thought no one would notice ethical transgressions among all the indirection of derivatives.