> Before the mid-1970s, debtors were able to get rid of student loans in bankruptcy court just as they could credit card debt or auto loans. But after scattered reports of new doctors and lawyers filing for bankruptcy and wiping away their student debt, resentful members of Congress changed the law in 1976.
> In an effort to protect the taxpayer money that is on the line every time a student or parent signs for a new federal loan, Congress toughened the law again in 1990 and again in 1998. In 2005, for-profit companies that lend money to students persuaded Congress to extend the same rules to their private loans.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/business/shedding-student-...
As R&D is extremely expensive, one theory is that colleges raised their tuition to help cover the venture capital requirements of research.
Add to that, you need a lot of overhead like administrative assistants, grant managers, technology transfer officers.
The former Dean of Georgia Tech's College of Computing reached a similar conclusion: http://innovate-edu.com/2011/05/18/if-you-have-to-ask-ten-su...
DOE is slightly more parsimonious with its overhead, NSF is the most conservative. DARPA gives overhead in all sorts of ranges. Or so I hear.
And TSRI doesn't give most of its professors salary, unless they are doing "administrative duties" (Pres, VP, dept chair, etc) If you run out of grants, you basically don't get paid anymore. At one point ~90% of TSRI operating costs were run off of NIH overhead, all coming in from a very dynamic patchwork of grants from all of their PIs. I think then the pressure to keep getting grants made the place a bit of a boiler room, there was an uptick in shady science (Peter Schultz's retractions, Geoffrey Chang's retractions, and others I'm not ready to talk about yet)... Eventually professors started leaving because they didn't want to take it anymore.
That's because an agency like the NIH, will have a program project and decide, "ok. We want project X to be done and we think it will take ~150,000 in JUST science costs" - in theory, that should be more or less invariant across the institutions that get funded. THEN an added cost is what it takes for it to get done in X institution. If overhead were calculated as % of the full grant, then the math gets trickier to isolate the "invariant science part".
The reason why separating the "invariant science part" is important, is because when the agencies send out an program call, they say, "you get $2M to do the science", and each institute that is bidding to get the grant is not supposed to know how much of that gets taken up by overhead by other institutes. The net result is each institute is competing for the same pool of "we can do science with this" money without the PIs having to worry about how much of the cookie gets eaten up by their own institute. In general, I don't really like much of anything to do with the federal government's involvement with science, but: The way this is structured is probably a good thing, since scientists are really bad at thinking about much besides their own science, and if you make them do this mental gymnastic, something's going to come short, and there will probably be more failure all around from lack of funds. The responsibility to figure out how to get that administrative cost then falls on the program manager - and the grant reviewers are instructed to take overhead into account.
I used the word "venture capital" loosely. I do not refer to the traditional sense of VCs on sand hill road, but venture capital in the sense of money that can pay for extremely specialized and expensive research equipment and labor.
In general, the Harvardization ("we must be the best at all areas of research") has infected even second-tier research institutions; for places like Harvard, MIT, etc. the financial gains from patents probably outweighs the outlay. However, for second-tier research institutions, they may be simply caught up in a ratings arms race.
Here is a report that has some interesting facts.
http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/cshe/working-papers/WP%236
'Over the current era, this has produced a pronounced intensification of research. For 99 research universities, enrollments grew by 15 percent from 1980 to 2000, but real research expenditures grew by 128 percent (Geiger, 2004, p. 147).'
As an anecdote, here's my personal example. As a PhD student in CS at a public US university, my experience has been this: all our equipment (mostly computers, CS is relatively cheap) has been paid from grants, and I have been funded from 3 sources: a 1-year federal fellowship (FAFSA), 1 year as a TA (that one was funded by the university, but in exchange for teaching) and the rest on a federal research project.
Now, it is possible that richer private universities do pay for their own equipment and researchers. I don't have any numbers for that, though.
On the other hand, if you are J6P and borrow the money you don't pay the cost, you pay a (fixed) monthly loan bill.
To about one sig fig, in constant dollars, at 20% interest aka 1980, you can borrow $30K for the same monthly payment as $150K at 3% aka 2010. Doesn't matter if they're "profit" or "non-profit" they're not leaving money on the table. Then factor in perhaps a factor of 4 in real world cost of living and nominal wages, and you can easily go from $3K in 1980 to $60K in 2010 without any "unhinging" happening at all.
Those are multi-generational extreme interest rates. It'll be "fun" to watch them revert to norms over a long enough run.
Its the same deal with property, for obvious reasons. The median dude will get the median education and live in the median house. The bank will get a constant median monthly payment. The centrally controlled interest rate will control what the providers get, but it won't affect joe6pack at all.