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Re:New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Se... by JshWright on Friday September 13, 2013 @01:46PM (#6381941)
It doesn't really impact the MiTM attacks described in the article.

An attacker who is able to sit in the middle with their own trusted cert is simply going to not bother passing the stapled OCSP response along. The victims browser will do an OCSP lookup (or not...) for the trusted cert the attacker provided, and that will succeed.

I'm not sure how OCSP caching is implemented in the browsers that implement OCSP in the first place (is there a spec for caching?), but as it's a method for checking the revocation status of certs, it can't be cached long.

Re:New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Se... by ck2 on Friday September 13, 2013 @02:44PM (#6382316)
I am not sure what it uses to validate but I have a ocsp stapling file I made

openssl test reports

     OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)
     Cert Status: good
     This Update: Sep  8 xx:xx:xx 2013 GMT
     Next Update: Sep 10 xx:xx:xx 2013 GMT

        Validity
            Not Before: Aug 22 xx:xx:xx 2013 GMT
            Not After : Oct  2 xx:xx:xx 2013 GMT
So that's quite a long cache. I thought it would fail after the 10th but apparently it is using the CA valid date range?