Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by nodata on Thursday September 12, 2013 @03:39PM
(#6376416)
Since the phone is covered in the password anyway, it would be interesting to see if it stands up to a gummi bear attack:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/16/gummi_bears_defeat_f...
Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by marvin on Thursday September 12, 2013 @05:03PM
(#6376925)
Have we seen this fingerprint reader yet? IBM/Lenovo ThinkPads use a reader that's just a tiny strip, so you actually have to swipe your finger instead of just planting it on the reader. This at the very least defends against simple attacks.
But I mean, a fingerprint is a physical thing which can be cloned, just like a key. And you also leave prints everywhere you go. It's not a silver bullet in authentication. All else being equal, passwords are safer against a determined attack, if we can assume correct usage.
Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by sjwright on Thursday September 12, 2013 @10:07PM
(#6378145)
Anyone who wants to go to that amount of trouble will find brute-forcing 10,000 possible pin codes to be just as easy.
Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by jonknee on Thursday September 12, 2013 @10:23PM
(#6378197)
Not when the data erases after a low number of misses.
Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by kevinwallace on Friday September 13, 2013 @12:45AM
(#6378703)
The data doesn't erase itself. The phone, in its original state, erases its copy of the data, but that doesn't help if you're operating with (a) a copy of the data, or (b) a modified phone, which is likely given an adversary that doesn't find cracking 10,000 PIN combinations to be a significant hurdle.
In particular, tools automating (b) already exist: http://gizmodo.com/5896992/the-xry-cracking-tool-is-unimpres...
Re:Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’
by hexley on Friday September 13, 2013 @04:43AM
(#6379294)
Actually, the data is encrypted firstly with a per-device key that is unique to the phone and unable to be accessed directly (unless you want to go decapping chips), then additionally with a hash of your pin or password. A copy of the data is useless unless you can get to it in an already unlocked state. An erase firstly deletes the encryption key entirely then begins a secure erase in the background.
Personally, I'd trust a 4-digit pin with a lockout timer to stand up better than fingerprint authentication. It looks cool in the movies, but it's never been a very bright idea.
Of course, most won't care if it's insecure, and being able to set different functions to automatically execute based on scanning different fingers (an ability laptop scanners have had for years) is certainly a selling point.