Speculating as to what could have happened makes no sense. The number who died is what it is, for better or worse.
As it stands 9/11 is actually a worse terrorist attack than can ever be achieved with the use of airplanes again, see Flight 93. So it doesn't make sense to consider these sorts of hypotheticals when talking about changing air security policy.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_World_Trade_Center_bombing
Anyway, as to why I didn't address non-air terrorism: I didn't set the scope of the discussion, I'm just participating in it. Sadly I'm well aware of the '93 bombing, the Bali bombings, the African embassy bombings... all sorts of non-aircraft attacks.
I literally said in my post that I was trying to make the "narrowest possible point". I meant it.
If either of the towers had fallen sooner or had fallen sideways instead of collapsing almost completely vertically, then it could have been much worse.
I'm trying to make the narrowest possible point when saying this: just that ~3K casualties was far from the worst case outcome that was possible that day.
EDIT: per my reply below, I'm only trying to make the discussion as honest as possible. At the core is the question, "Given X casualties to air travel based terror attacks, is a particular security policy worth implementing if it leads to Y casualties indirectly?". I'm addressing a shortcoming in what I see as the figure being used for X, since it's a small data set. It would be interesting to address the effectiveness (% of attacks thwarted or discouraged) of the security policy, too.