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Re:Google speeding up end-to-end crypto between data centers... by devx on Monday September 09, 2013 @02:15AM (#6352097)
Speaking of untrustworthy employees, and HUMINT, the NSA/CIA could just have agents infiltrated at Google, to get access to a lot of that data.

This is what's so striking about this. I thought Google already encrypted all data, and only a few people had access to it. Didn't they say this many years ago?

Re:Google speeding up end-to-end crypto between data centers... by raldi on Monday September 09, 2013 @02:28AM (#6352127)
"Encrypt all data" is a vague term. For example, would that include encrypting it while a CPU is processing it? What about when the CPU is writing it to RAM? What if the RAM is on some other computer in the rack? What if it's in some computer on the other side of the world?

I'm not sure what Google's public statements on this have been, but if you want to research it, be sure to distinguish statements regarding user data at rest from those regarding user data in transit.

Re:Google speeding up end-to-end crypto between data centers... by some_googler on Monday September 09, 2013 @09:31AM (#6353291)
"the NSA/CIA could just have agents infiltrated at Google, to get access to a lot of that data" -- this would be really difficult, because no single person at Google can just sudo in some system and feast over sensitive data. Any access to user data or other highly sensitive data needs to go through a stack of authorizations, the granted access will be scoped, and we have obsessive amounts of logging in place even for trivial stuff let alone sensitive systems and data. One thing that surprised me with the Snowden leaks is that the NSA's "checks and balances" seems to be orders of magnitude inferior to what we have at Google; something like that is unimaginable here (esp. if you can believe the NSA in that they don't even know which documents were accessed). Even a conspiracy involving several infiltrated googlers at the right places couldn't do it without anyone noticing, because they'd need to sabotage code and configurations that live in repositories that thousands of engineers have access to (and have enforced code-review workflows); the internal openness of our systems is in fact among our best defenses against sabotage.