I highly suspect "breaking most of the cryptography on the internet" is an over statement and that most of what they can break derive from people using weak cryptographic algorithms and/or making mistakes in the usage of cryptographic primitives.
Unfortunately, the debate is mostly centered around if crypto is broken, while the question to ponder is why is the state suddenly forcing well-meaning people to start thinking like people who have something to hide.
My intent is that if there is a deliberate weakening of certain entropy sources, that my pool is sufficiently different to at least complicate attacks which are guided by information like browser signatures.
Maybe it's not a perfectly secure solution but hopefully my network isn't among the lowest hanging fruit.
The only flaw in the DHM algorithm is that it depends on a RNG.
It goes back to the fact that if the NSA has infiltrated the RNG, then DHM key exchange is merely a slight nuisance.
I wrote some software that patched out MS' CryptGenRandom() to only return 0x01's all day. I was easily able to then implement a MITM attack on Adobe RTMPE traffic all day long.
I'm stupid... Imagine what an NSA engineer could accomplish.