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Re:Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove Eclipsing N.S.A.’s by derefr on Monday September 02, 2013 @03:14AM (#6313844)
As far as I know, we've never yet created a cryptographic algorithm that's withstood more than 20 years of scrutiny. We could assume this trend continues into the future, and that any crypto algorithm we do create will be broken within 20 years. This means that encrypting a piece of data isn't some magical eternal protection--it just seals it in a time-capsule that'll "degrade" after 20 years or less. (Sometimes far less.)

But, so far, this property has also been pretty much irrelevant: almost all the things we want to do by passing along a secret are time-sensitive, and breaking the secret 20 years after the fact doesn't really buy you anything. Being able to impersonate the SSL key of Microsoft.com-as-it-was-in-1993 doesn't let you do anything to Microsoft.com-as-it-is-today.

This policy scales down, of course: in military comsec terms, you only need the encryption on operational details to last until the day after the operation is carried out. After that, your "secret" has become "plain" (something quite obviously blew up, etc.) and so the enemy breaking the encryption on the orders won't tell them anything they didn't already realize by hearing the explosion.

This is why the military keeps multiple different kinds of ciphers for different levels of secrecy, by the way: they assume that the more things they use a particular crypto algorithm for--the more signals the enemy gets to intercept that use that algorithm--the more enemy sigint folks will be put to the task of breaking that algorithm. So "top secret" encryption isn't meant to withstand any more scrutiny than "secret" encryption; it's just generally a bunch of orthogonal crypto primitives to the ones in the merely-secret crypto, and only used rarely, for the kinds of orders that need to stay secret long after execution (e.g. covert ops on allies.) Thus, enemy nations will have comparatively little reason to have analyzed and broken it--and breaking the secret-level ciphers won't help them, because of the orthogonal implementations.

Re:Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove Eclipsing N.S.A.’s by bad_user on Monday September 02, 2013 @08:15AM (#6314777)
You're right of course, however we need to make a distinction here.

First of all there's the issue of how strong is an encryption algorithm. For example RSA is based on the problem of factoring large numbers, a problem that's generally considered to be hard as we know of no efficient algorithm for solving it. But we haven't proved that factoring large numbers will remain a hard to solve problem in the future. The NSA could very well have custom hardware for efficiently factoring 1024-bit primes by now and the upcoming quantum computing is a real threat. If they haven't done it by now, 1024-bit keys will become breakable in the future, however 2048-bit keys are another issue entirely and 4096-bit keys will probably stay unbreakable.

But, even if breakthroughs in solving the integer factorization problem will be made in the future, as long as P != NP then perfect encryption is possible. In fact, we already know of encryption schemes that are provably unbreakable even with unlimited hardware at disposal, the problem being that they are also hard to implement, so we ended up with making tradeoffs.

Second, it's far easier to attack a particular implementation, to bypass the encryption algorithm entirely, e.g. attacks against the key generation system, side-channels, the protocol of the software system we are talking about, etc ... because software always has bugs, as in zero-day exploits that one could make use of.

For this reason - if indeed the military is using different encryption algorithms for different security levels, algorithms that aren't used in the wild, then to me that's a pretty bad idea, as far more often than not it's the implementation that's broken, not the algorithm. And in case of inside leaks, the implementation is always easier to get a hold of, compared to the key.

Re:Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove Eclipsing N.S.A.’s by derefr on Monday September 02, 2013 @09:04AM (#6314943)
Military comsec basically has to assume the implementation will be immediately made available to enemy sigint, since they build crypto implementations into things like secure phones which can just be stolen off a dead soldier and pulled apart.

The implementations can be upgraded in the field when a flaw is found, as with any firmware (and frequently an implementation will be cycled out for a different one even if it is thought to be unbroken, just to put any time that's been put into breaking it to waste.) But enemy governments are precisely the people with enough resources, and reason, to want to break entire algorithms.

The thing is, it is a hard problem--so they only bother to break algorithms where they know they'll get big rewards for doing so ("top secret" doesn't usually mean more valuable to enemies, after all; usually it just means "fewer people should know this ever happened.") A standard secure phone will have all the Suite A and Suite B ciphers[1] built into it, but since so many more transmissions will be using Suite B ciphers, there'll be comparatively less strategic advantage in cracking the currently-used Suite A cipher before it's cycled out for the next one. So Suite B ciphers sometimes do get cracked during their "useful shelf-life" and have to be immediately switched, while Suite A ciphers are usually left alone.

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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_A_Cryptography, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_B_Cryptography

Re:Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove Eclipsing N.S.A.’s by eru on Monday September 02, 2013 @09:07PM (#6318139)
Diffie-Hellman and RSA are older than 20 years, aren't they?

Also DES has never been `broken'---only brute-forced.