I also worry that promoting this practice would make some developers think that they didn't need a random, per-password salt as well. It's hard enough to convince developers about the value of using strong key derivation functions and a per-password salt, and if you added a global salt I'd worry that some would think that the per-password salt is not necessary. Then once the fixed salt were compromised, brute forcing individual passwords would become trivial.
Also remember, the attacker could easily create an account with a known password, and they can get the normal salt from the password database. Now they just need to brute force the single "fixed salt", and you're back to where you started.
No, it's much better to encourage people to just use strong password hash functions, like bcrypt or scrypt, with good, random, per password salts, than to try to apply a little security through obscurity by adding yet another salt that is likely easy to find.
1. DB backup is compromised (from an offsite backup storage, think S3).
2. Developer laptop lost, with a copy of the database locally. (source code may be available, but the site-specific key probably wouldn't be. As that's a config var on the server).
3. SQLi that dumps hashes to the page.
I'm a big fan of making the job harder for attackers. There are lots of attack vectors where a 'pepper' value would be useless. But not all of them. And it's nearly free to implement. Might as well.
The point in using fixed salt would be that quite often the password leaks seem to be result of SQL injection attacks and therefore the attacker only gains access to the database. Not the source code. The password hashes from database would be much harder to crack if we were also using a fixed salt string that was only stored in code.
Technically adding this kind of extra salt would be trivial on all platforms. I can't figure out any negative side effects related to it (Obviously it is not replacement to better password hashing schemes).