I'm writing assembly code, I've spent time also to measure the time of the machine operations etc, so I simply can't imagine the valid argument which ignores exact limitations present in actual hardware.
(Google for "Illinois Malicious Processors" for what an attacker might actually do. A few extra transistors here and there can lay you wide open.)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug
I still don't see how adding "almost incorrectly" would have not be detected in practice. In practice you also have to implement "almost incorrectly" in a way that doesn't affect the performance of your CPU. We are talking about processors, not Ruby interpreters.
You can't compare that kind of error to a deliberately hidden flaw.
The possible flaws with Lenovo computers haven't, as far as I know, been found anyone other than the spooks. (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6108980)
The RNG attack has correct behaviour under every statistical and blackbox analysis. The only way you can break it externally is if you have the key.
If you were designing a cryptosystem you'd pick the one where the security lies in the key and not in obfuscation. The same applies when designing an attack you want to keep secret.
Quick ig1, you are freedom's last, best hope. Write actual computer code which can, by adding numbers together and inspecting their output, determine whether your Ruby interpreter has been compromised by the NSA. You're lucky, since the NSA has already shipped their exploit (or did they?), they can't modify it in response to your detection code. Bad news, though: if your detection code fails and an interpreter which includes the backdoor can, after passing your detection code, still get the wrong answer for 1 + 1, an innocent user fails to find the backdoor and suffers a FatalHitByCruiseMissileError. You don't get to say "OK, so in hindsight, now that I see the backdoor addressing it was pretty darn easy. Mop up the mess and I'm sure to win round two."