Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by vbuterin on Monday August 12, 2013 @05:04AM
(#6198317)
Actually, the key-recovery process is quite useful. The reason is that instead of having your public key be the public key itself, you can use the hash of your public key (ie. Bitcoin address) instead. This cuts the required "public key" length in half for the same level of security. The verification protocol then becomes
def verify(msg,sig,addr): return pubkey_to_address(ecdsa_recover(msg,sig)) == addr
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by nly on Monday August 12, 2013 @07:38AM
(#6198670)
Yes, Bitcoin is one exception because of the digested addresses, but if I'm up to date it's not currently used on the network. There's no opcode in the transaction script to perform recovery, so currently you can't reduce transaction size by omitting public keys. I suppose the primary advantage in Bitcoin is the reduced storage space.
Most of the time this property is useless, because you want to verify the signature against a known-good key, but it does also mean you're probably not going to want to use DSA to pass signed covert messages.
Schnorr signatures actually have a simpler, and I think more intuitive, construction and don't have this property. They also don't require collision resistant hashes.