Your UPDATE is right, attacker can probe a..z 2 times, and just choose the letter that was compressed in both of them, ignoring random compressions
Thanks, but can you clarify... does that mean probing (a..z)×(a..z) (one pair per probe), so there's at least a giant increase in probing required per character? And perhaps even more each character in, since probing for the Nth character now requires (a..z)^(N-1) × (a..z)×(a..z) ?
(I'm guessing also, though, it may be possible to probabilistically probe multiple ranges of the secret at once... in a process that seems vaguely similar to forward-error-correction coding.)
also we need a reflector with 'value="' in the beginning https://twitter.com/homakov/status/364872768921165824/photo/...
There may be other secrets that need protection in other ways, and maybe this would make any random-source issues more exploitable... but this would seem to protect the CSRF token, in a cheap and minimal way.
UPDATE: Thinking further, though, maybe the attacker can probe for both values at the same time, and thus determine the probability of certain pairs, and thus this only slows the attack? I'd appreciate an expert opinion, as this was the first mitigation that came to mind, and if it's wrong-headed I'd like to bash my intuition into better shape with a clue-hammer.