Modern Intel x86 processors now have a hardware RNG built in, so even if the host boots without any devices, you have a source of entropy.
(Incidentally, KVM defaults to /dev/random which might create a DoS vulnerability if a guest exhausts entropy.)
Exposing hardware RNGs to guest VMs would be great; entropy in guests is pretty lousy in general, not just at first boot (though obviously at first boot it's at its very worst).
If you want more than that in a cheap Heath Robinson manner (Americans: think Rube Goldberg if you are unaware of Heath, their work came from very similar inspirations) then many SoC solutions have a built-in RNG of sufficient quality for general cryptographic use and some solutions expose them easily. If you enable the relevant module a Raspberry Pi can provide up to ~550,000 bits/sec when asked to, for instance, which if one-off cost is a factor beats paying a few hundred dollars or more for a USB device providing the same sort of rate.
Based on the HAVEGE research http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/
I wouldn't say "surprised", more that I wonder why and if there's maybe a good reason for it--that seems more interesting than the notion of surprise to me, anyway :)
Especially considering pretty much everything I've heard about entropy-generation over the years mentions that getting entropy just after boot is a difficult problem.
I'm assuming there must be some truth to that, so your surprise is my curiosity for the explanation why that probably wouldn't work (yes I'm assuming it won't work, sorry, but I really think otherwise they'd be using it :) ). Does anyone know?
I don't post comments to demonstrate my cleverness (I hope). I post to tell about an interesting experience, make a careful argument, answer a question about which I'm knowledgeable, or solicit feedback. An expression of surprise for me is a solicitation for information. I was hoping someone with more domain knowledge would have some insight that I could integrate into my model. I realize that some people do just post comments to show their cleverness, and there's no way you could have known my intent without knowing me, so that feedback is well taken. I'll try to be clearer in the future about my intent.
I absolutely agree that what I said probably wouldn't work - no need to apologize! The prior probability for P(simple solution not used by experts | simple solution obvious to a non-expert) is low.
[1] http://lesswrong.com/lw/if/your_strength_as_a_rationalist/
now I doubt we'll get an expert with domain knowledge to jump in after five days though :)
We've actually talked a lot about trying to write a xen driver to share a hardware entropy device, but it hasn't gone anywhere. (I mean, xen has 'vtpm' - a virtualized Trusted Platform Module. And nobody uses that, so why not a vrandom?)
But I agree this sounds like a good way to handle user authentication.
Essentially, the trust bar for entropy is set so high that no-one who understood the product enough to want it, was willing to trust it enough to actually use it.
(It's not just for SSH keys; random values are required for e.g. SSL connection setup, too)
Ah, also: by "HVM operators" I didn't mean AWS, Linode, Digital Ocean etc; I meant the admins of virtual machines running on their platforms, plus anyone running a private cloud or even someone with just a bunch of Xen/KVM boxes in a DC.
Linux distros mitigate the cold boot entropy problem by saving some state from the RNG on shutdown (on Debian, it's saved in /var/lib/urandom/random-seed) and using it to seed the RNG on the next boot. On physical servers this obviously isn't available on the first boot, and on cloud servers, the provider often bakes the same random-seed file into all their images, so everyone gets the same seed on first boot (fortunately this doesn't harm security any more than having no random-seed file at all, but it doesn't help either). What cloud providers should really do is generate (from a good source of randomness) a distinct random-seed file for every server that's created, but I haven't seen any providers do this.