MITM attacks are only possible if you have a privileged location in the network: "the middle". Further, it is easily possible that neither the people operating Site A nor the people operating Site B have access to the SSL certificate for this domain name, as they might be behind a proxy or load balancer operated by the people holding the domain's SSL certificate. You can't just randomly MITM someone else's traffic: you need all the pieces together.
Your assumptions about what is possible in certain hypothetical situations should not cause all security opportunities to be eroded. I mean, seriously: the logical conclusion to your argument is that all non-SSL websites should just share a global pool of insecure cookies, because it isn't like any of it can be considered secure anyway. The people you are protecting yourself from matters: these attacks are different threat models, and are secured separately.
Here, let me show my work:
1. All these cross-origin protections the browser uses are basically entirely meaningless without SSL, because you're talking to an unathenticated counterparty. So you've got to assume site A is using SSL+HSTS before a conversation about cross-origin protection even becomes coherent. You've also got to assume that, since site A is using HSTS, site B has to attack it by running SSL as well.
2. Now, with SSL, you can't have two separate sites on the same domain unless they're mutually-trusting, because they would need to share the same cert--and thus both have copies of the private key used to generate that cert. (Unless a CA screwed up and double-issued a cert, that is.) So you have to assume the attacker is now on a separate domain (or using a self-signed cert) for the conversation about cross-origin protection to retain coherency.
3. Disallow connections to sites with self-signed certs. (Browsers already do this.)
4. Do all the cross-origin protection stuff--like not sending cookies--when the domain is different. (Browsers already do this.)
5. You're done, because the previous assumptions simplified the problem.
Your browser's SSL logic, combined with CAs' certificate-signing policies, have effectively protected you from talking to anything running on the same domain as site A, which doesn't also use the cert site A uses. Everything left is either mutually-trustworthy (that is, has access to site A's SSL private key), or has managed to break your SSL stack somewhere--in which case, we're back to the "you're screwed because you're talking to an unauthenticated counterparty" problem.