News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Protect your freedom and privacy by FedRegister on Monday July 22, 2013 @01:36AM (#6081958)
> (ie, fetching keys from keyservers, encrypting automatically, etc)

No no no no no! The keyservers have no authentication for key addition. Anybody can put up a key for any email address and effectively wedge themselves man in the middle.

Re:Protect your freedom and privacy by bigiain on Monday July 22, 2013 @03:14AM (#6082265)
Also, the paranoid in me (and probably more significantly, the keyboard-activist-in-the-safety-of-my-parents-basement) suggests that it might be wise to access keyservers over TOR.

If _I_ were involved with PRISM, the pipe running to pgp.mit.edu would be one of the most monitored connections around. "Hmmm, someone just searched for a PGP key for FedRegister - lets see what else that IP address has searched for, and what's in all the gmail inboxes that have ever been accessed using that IP address…"

Re:Protect your freedom and privacy by grabhive on Monday July 22, 2013 @06:33AM (#6082894)
Yes. This is the way that hackers should be thinking from now on.
Re:Protect your freedom and privacy by chimeracoder on Monday July 22, 2013 @10:24AM (#6083819)
facepalm

Yes, I redact my above comment to remove that example.

However, I still stand by my statement that PGP UX is a client issue, not an inherent protocol issue (ie, it's fixable without abandoning PGP entirely).