There's still, however, the problem of the Fourth Amendment. To my High-School-Civics understanding of the US Government, these programs are patently unconstitutional.
If these programs are indeed essential to our security, if they are to become a permanent fixture of our civil society, then let the Constitution be amended to allow them. Otherwise, no amount of oversight by any (or all) of the branches of the government will be sufficient to legitimize any such programs.
1. Surveillance of United States Person (USPER) communication. 2. Surveillance of non-USPER communications.
With regard to (2), the Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign nationals. That's not very reassuring for those outside the United States, but it is a well established principle of Constitutional law.
With regard to (1), the FISA court has carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment, relying upon Skillman and its progeny. Now, that's a very shaky justification, and probably wouldn't hold up before SCOTUS.
So, at present they are within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, under the FISA court's interpretation of the law. However, that foundation is not very solid. I agree that we need a data-mining amendment to the Constitution if we're going to continue with these behaviors.
Power is not given to the courts to make new law. The legal contortions required to twist the intent and letter of the Fourth Amendment so that it agrees with NSA, without making new law would be obscene.
relying upon Skillman and its progeny
Google wasn't helpful in locating a case/decision referred to as "Skillman". Can you elaborate?
Unfortunately that's exactly what happened. When the government went to the FISA court and asked for approval to conduct broad monitoring, the FISA court ruled that such monitoring, so long as it was limited to metadata and used for certain purposes, was exempt from the Fourth Amendment under the "special needs" doctrine.
The case they relied upon was Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, not Skillman as previously stated, which involved drug testing of Federal railway workers. There the court ruled that, given the overriding interest of protecting public safety, limited encroachments upon personal freedoms were not violative of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable" searches.
Basically, the FISA court is writing its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in secret, which can't be effectively challenged by surveillance targets as they lack standing in the courts to sue.
Here's a nice summary from the NYT: http://http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-...
That's not to say that the government didn't just mint a few hundred new highly skilled blackhat "hactivists" by deploying this technology.
9/11 was enabled by box cutters - the message was that this was super low tech and you often can't stop the most awful terrorism if people are really determined and feel they have nothing to lose. The good news for you is that news events are by definition rare and there's actually so little terrorism (in the west at least) - that's because there's not nearly as much motivation to commit these acts as many seem to believe, not because of robocops peering into your drawers.
My desires oppose your desires. Which of us gets to live in the world we desire to bring into being?
I hope the answer is that it is my world because I don't want to live in yours, thanks all the same.
Tis a conundrum.
If only there was some way for us to compromise.
And what happens if the government becomes the one that wants to cause regular citizens harm? How do you protest a government that knows everything, monitors everything?
On a personal note, I knew people at the Boston marathon finish line, as I'm sure many of you did as well. My parents had friends in the World Trade Center. If we could stop that in the future, that is worth a small sacrifice in personal liberty. Again, this a personal opinion, one that many do not share.
To me, the key is creating adequate oversight to control this leviathan. We need a real court, with proper appointment procedures and adversarial process. We need restoration of legislative oversight. Most importantly, we need strong encryption on the systems that can only be unlocked with a court order.
In fact, this was the original design of Total Information Awareness. The privacy tech got gutted somewhere in development, but there's no reason we can't bring it back.