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Re:Anonymous Browser Fingerprinting in Practice by Renaud on Monday July 15, 2013 @10:45AM (#6045840)
One way to counter browser fingerprinting could be to add a plugin that simply report random data when queried. This would invalidate the hashing.

Of course, if the plugin is well known, it could be removed by the fingerprinting code, unless it can disguise itself as something else -more or less random- when it is installed.

Re:Anonymous Browser Fingerprinting in Practice by morpher on Monday July 15, 2013 @11:23AM (#6046129)
Wouldn't a better solution be to simply modify the bowser to report some base set of fonts / plugins (and any other high-information content fields)? How many sites actually legitimately serve different content based on your fonts or plugins? Also, the UA string could be simplified to reveal less.
Re:Anonymous Browser Fingerprinting in Practice by fingerprinter on Monday July 15, 2013 @12:56PM (#6046810)
I just have a couple of personal plugins that will change my reported UA slightly, my fonts collection slightly and some other random bits. Just screws it up enough so I know I'm not tracked.
Re:Anonymous Browser Fingerprinting in Practice by ilikepi on Monday July 15, 2013 @02:25PM (#6047548)
Would you consider releasing these, or are you concerned if they were more common they would become less effective?
Re:Anonymous Browser Fingerprinting in Practice by peterwwillis on Monday July 15, 2013 @03:23PM (#6047968)
Nope, already thought of, and not for what you'd expect.

Authentication systems using Browser ID create a value based on the browser identification bits and apply a ratio of how close the value is to a given user's fingerprint, so your values may change (like when you resize your screen) but it'll approximate the fingerprint as the user's. In other words, if it's close, it still matches.