Re:Kremlin turns back to typewriters to avoid security leaks
by D9u on Sunday July 14, 2013 @04:55PM
(#6042202)
The electrical emanations from the typewriter can be used to detect the characters typed regardless of whether or not an electronic display is used, and TEMPEST, which is a method of securing electronic devices, will protect the typewriter's emanations from outside detection, and, as mentioned by Daniel_Newby, electric typewriters are vulnerable to power line reading, but if the system is entirely disconnected from any external power source, as TEMPEST dictates, and the entire facility is held to TEMPEST standards, then the typewriter will be secured against external eavesdropping.
Any attempts at picking up audio|electronic emanations will be foiled by traditional TEMPEST type protection.
Typewriter ribbons can be dealt with by old fashioned incineration.
The only way to acquire a signal would be by infiltration of the facility housing the targeted systems.
Re:Kremlin turns back to typewriters to avoid security leaks
by keithpeter on Sunday July 14, 2013 @04:29PM
(#6042121)
http://freesound.org/people/keithpeter/sounds/123344/
Anyone care to process this clip? I might even have the 'plain text' around somewhere.
On a serious note; I used to get about 5 carbons max on a mechanical office typewriter years go using 'onion skin' paper.
Photocopiers mostly use scanners these days? Back to square one?
Re:Kremlin turns back to typewriters to avoid security leaks
by Daniel_Newby on Sunday July 14, 2013 @04:03PM
(#6042032)
Worse, these are electric typewriters, allowing for remote power line snooping.
It is easier to tell what a typist is typing from their audio signature than it is to TEMPEST a monitor, especially now with modern EMC requirements cutting down the usable signal.
Some people used to have "low emission fonts"; fuzzy edges in very low contrast.