Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by ig1 on Sunday July 14, 2013 @12:30PM
(#6041300)
It's about verifiability, you can verify if a CPU is multiplying incorrectly, there's no way of verifying if the random source is generating randomness correctly.
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Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by tptacek on Sunday July 14, 2013 @12:49PM
(#6041338)
You can verify that your CPU is multiply correctly at one moment in time.
Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by ig1 on Sunday July 14, 2013 @12:53PM
(#6041348)
Yes, but active attacks where a third-party can switch on-and-off features on your CPU are obviously vastly different from a passive attack such as a compromised random number source.
The RNG attack suggested can pass verifiability while at the exact same time introduce a backdoor and thus constantly be on.
Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by pbsd on Sunday July 14, 2013 @01:19PM
(#6041427)
Are you ready to test all the 2^128 possible multiplications your CPU can do?
Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by ig1 on Sunday July 14, 2013 @01:41PM
(#6041503)
Integers form a closed group (in the group theory sense) under multiplication and addition, so if you were concerned about specific calculations being compromised you could verify the answer via alternative calculations and testing for consistency.
Faking consistency is likely impossible without causing a huge amount other calculations (which the CPU will do as part of day-to-day operations) to fail.