Re:Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing th...
by nullc on Sunday July 14, 2013 @11:37AM
(#6041132)
This doesn't preclude RdRand from being _worse_ however.
If your software— by design— eliminates side channels and isolates out timing. Then your hypothetical evil AES() would have a hard time screwing you over— it still might, somehow, but the window may be very narrow.
The only way to narrow the exposure from a bad rdrand is to never use it directly (e.g. without whitening via a CSPRNG with other truly random inputs).
If your software— by design— eliminates side channels and isolates out timing. Then your hypothetical evil AES() would have a hard time screwing you over— it still might, somehow, but the window may be very narrow.
The only way to narrow the exposure from a bad rdrand is to never use it directly (e.g. without whitening via a CSPRNG with other truly random inputs).