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Re:Assange: How cryptography is a key weapon in the fight ag... by Zigurd on Wednesday July 10, 2013 @06:46PM (#6023299)
If there is a voice or video medium in the call, you can be pretty sure. If you are concerned about MITM for text and other data media, better to use non-real-time system that would use signed keys and public key crypto.

It sure would be nice if some major internet service offered a PKI-like service.

Re:Assange: How cryptography is a key weapon in the fight ag... by contingencies on Wednesday July 10, 2013 @07:51PM (#6023617)
Most online communications (web, forums, emails) are not real time, so that kind of weighs heavily against OTR-like solutions for everything.

PKI offered by a central party is not really any different to X.509 CA's today.

Re:Assange: How cryptography is a key weapon in the fight ag... by Zigurd on Wednesday July 10, 2013 @10:06PM (#6024084)
That's right re PKIs, which is why I said "PKI-like service." I don't believe the conventional definition of PKI is useful. What would you call it?
Re:Assange: How cryptography is a key weapon in the fight ag... by contingencies on Thursday July 11, 2013 @02:12AM (#6024717)
I'd call it X.509 Certificate Authorities. Unfortunately, the root of that is busted, so we should build on something else.

The same thing could be done with GPG, via identity validation (jumping through whichever hoops are required to link people's claimed 'real' world identities with their keys; probably checking documentation and then signing a key). However, that's probably best achieved via some decentralized method rather than trusting a centralized corporate intermediary as per X.509 CA's.