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Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by sjmulder on Monday July 08, 2013 @09:34AM (#6006656)
> We've known how to send cryptographically secure e-mail since the early 1990s.

Can we even trust encryption? How can we know that the NSA haven’t found weaknesses in common encryption algorithms? They have some of this field’s best people in the world on this.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by jgrahamc on Monday July 08, 2013 @11:14AM (#6007160)
You can't know that. You can even worry about the fact that James Bamford wrote in Wired in 2012 [1]:

"According to another top official also involved with the program, the NSA made an enormous breakthrough several years ago in its ability to cryptanalyze, or break, unfathomably complex encryption systems employed by not only governments around the world but also many average computer users in the US."

What do many average computer users use? TLS is my guess. So, perhaps they've found a way to get into RC4, or made an advance in factoring. And the history of cryptanalysis says that they are likely years and years ahead of what's known outside. So, what can you do?

Well, you can read the ECRYPT II report [2] and see for yourself what Europe's cryptographers think about the security of various algorithms and what key lengths they recommend.

For example, the report recommends that an asymmetric key of 3,248 bits should be secure to 2040 (they recommend a symmetric key of 128 bits for the same period). So, the subtext is that an 2,048 bit RSA key is going to be breakable soon by a powerful adversary.

The report says, for example of RSA OAEP: "If used, we recommend at least |N|>1024 for legacy systems and |N|>2432 for new systems."

My brief summary is that I'm happiest with RSA keys of 4,096 bits or above and with symmetric keys of 256 bits.

[1] http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/

[2] http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/

PS I'd be curious to know what key length Snowden used for the GPG key he apparently used when communicating with Greenwald.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by damarquis on Monday July 08, 2013 @03:15PM (#6008590)
Anonymous sources might be supplying real information but they could also be trying to manage beliefs.

Undoubtedly the NSA is ahead of everyone else in cryptanalysis but I think it is also advantageous for the NSA to have foreign governments think the NSA has a bigger lead than they actually do. This belief would cause foreign governments to use larger key sizes, and so drive up their costs, or switch to less well tested encryption methods that the NSA might be able to break.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by jlgaddis on Tuesday July 09, 2013 @10:07AM (#6012697)
> ... but I think it is also advantageous for the NSA to have foreign governments think the NSA has a bigger lead than they actually do.

I would think it is more advantageous for the NSA to have others believe that it has less capabilities than they actually do.

The NSA is well known for its disinformation campaigns. Why wouldn't they try to make others (governments, end users, etc.) believe that they don't have the ability to break various key sizes.

This could provide a false sense of security to others and cause them to believe that, for example, a 2048-bit PGP key is more than sufficient when, in fact, it isn't.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by damarquis on Tuesday July 09, 2013 @07:09PM (#6016306)
I'm not arguing that there aren't situations where then spreading the belief that their capabilities are less than actual would be a good thing. If the goal is to break a specific subset of all encrypted messages then this is exactly what they would want.

But there are also situations where they would want the opposite. For example, suppose the NSA has no advantage in breaking RSA over public knowledge, but can easily break NTRU and their goal is to read as many encrypted messages as possible. Then if they can get everyone to believe they can break RSA but not any cryptosystem based on lattices then some people will switch to NTRU. Now its much cheaper for the NSA to achieve their goal of breaking lots of encrypted messages since they have a very efficient algorithm for reading NTRU encryptions.

(This belief could be spread simply by having an "anonymous but very senior" official talk to Wired about how the US government has made a major step towards building the first scalable quantum computer)

In short, what they should want the world to believe depends on their capabilities and goals. Without knowing those anything is possible.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by superuser2 on Monday July 08, 2013 @08:16PM (#6010312)
If the NSA can break encryption, they're probably only doing it for specific individuals they're interested in. And if the NSA is interested in spending resources on you, specifically, you have a world of problems besides encryption:

- Are you managing TEMPEST? Do you know what's on the other side of your walls?

- Who else has an access card/PIN/key to get near your computer? Cleaning service? Custodians? Other tenants?

- Are you running Windows?

- Do you read and fully understand every line of code of every security patch all of the time? Do you compile them yourself? Because no matter how much you may believe in Linux, package maintainers and repository owners are still people who are subject the laws of a sovereign nation.

- Do you trust your BIOS? Does your motherboard have Intel vPro or similar?

- Is your Java out of date?

- Where else have you used your password?

- If you're doing anything other than Gmail via Chrome, do you check to make sure the SSL certificate is from the correct CA? Do you check it every time?

- Do you know that everyone you ever communicate with is always perfectly on top of all of these (and other) potential vulnerabilities all of the time with no exceptions ever?

If not, then it doesn't matter whether we can still trust encryption. Because we certainly can't (by default) trust endpoints.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by Lavery on Monday July 08, 2013 @01:09PM (#6007804)
Encryption is worthwhile because even if the NSA has decryption capabilities that they have kept secret, the very secrecy of this ability is valuable enough to strongly discourage its use.

It is extremely unlikely that your email is important enough to the NSA for them to risk disclosing their ability and pushing everyone to different or stronger algorithms.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by 6d0debc071 on Monday July 08, 2013 @02:32PM (#6008305)
Mmmm, though that depends how effectively can credibly you can publish them attacking you that way.
Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by Lavery on Monday July 08, 2013 @02:45PM (#6008385)
Well, to a degree. It also depends on the extent to which the NSA believes they can trust their low/mid-level analysts: after the recent incident with Snowden, I'd argue "not much".

The more widely they allow such attacks to be used, the more people need know of its existence, and the greater their risk of exposure (even if the victims of these attacks are themselves oblivious).

Depending on who we're imagining as the victim, you also don't necessarily have to publish at all.

Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by martin_k on Monday July 08, 2013 @10:07AM (#6006807)
I think it was mentioned somewhere that Snowden used GPG in his communication with Greenwald. At least some people inside the NSA seem to regard it as secure.
Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by kimlelly on Monday July 08, 2013 @10:34AM (#6006953)
Snowden said "Encryption works. Unfortunately, endpoint security is still weak."
Re:Protecting E-Mail from Eavesdropping by jlgreco on Monday July 08, 2013 @12:16PM (#6007515)
The NSA has a history of using those best people in the world to improve security of encryption, even when the general public does not understand their improvements at the time.

Now, maybe something has changed since then, but I am fairly confident that is not the case.