Oh no... http://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/en/power-transmission/ http://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/en/fossil-power-generation/ http://www.siemens.co.uk/en/news_press/index/news_archive/20...
What I meant was, how diverse are the control systems for national grids. If they are highly diverse then they are going to be more difficult to target, if they are all the same generation kit from the same vendor then the threat will be higher.
Which one is it?
So your point is valid, but diversity doesn't help if the overall resilience of the grid is so low that attacking a few carefully chosen targets could cause a massive blackout.
Typically you might only need to cause a few targeted failures at the right time, and if you do this in a nasty way you can cause a cascading failure, taking out key transmission lines or other nodes in the network.
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cascading_failure
* Structural Vulnerability of the North American Power Grid - http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0401084v1.pdf
* Risk-aware Attacks and Catastrophic Cascading Failures in U.S. Power Grid - http://www.ele.uri.edu/nest/paper/Globecom_2011.pdf
It's a very "Dr Evil" topic, I know...
Didn't Stuxnet target very specific Siemens SCADA systems, unless our grids all run the same controllers and the same software (which they might well do, I have no idea) - surely an attack like that would be difficult to scale?