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Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by StavrosK on Saturday July 06, 2013 @10:17AM (#5998925)
> they think that because something is proven in a mathematical sense using their current knowledge of viable routes of deducation that it remains 'true' and unassailable.

That's because it does.

> The threat of someone else having or coming up with a faster physical or logical method of deduction does threaten these assumptions.

No, it doesn't, because there are no assumptions.

> The broader goal, then, is not to trust a single PRNG algorithm, or, if possible, branch of mathematics.

No, if you don't trust something, use something you do trust. The change you're proposing has more potential to do harm than good, e.g. render nine perfectly good PRNGs broken just because you mixed them with one broken one. If you had only used one PRNG, your adversary had to break that PRNG, but, now that you used ten, he only has to break the weakest one, so you've made things much easier for him.

> whilst computationally and resource-wise somewhat more costly, probably a good idea.

Nope, it probably isn't.

> In summary: hedge thy bets.

In summary, the entire crypto community is smarter than you (or me), and any improvement you (or I) think might work has probably been proven hopelessly broken a thousand times over. There's a reason people use a single PRNG, and the reason is that, when your PRNG's output is provably indistinguishable from true randomness, messing with it will certainly not improve it, and will probably ruin it.

Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by contingencies on Saturday July 06, 2013 @01:06PM (#5999343)
> There's a reason people use a single PRNG

I just want to know what it is.

(Edit as can't reply to child: Sure, but this gets back to the mathematical analysis does not equal real world proof, since we do not know all possible computational (or side channel!) vectors. Assertion otherwise is reminiscent of Socrates: οὖτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴμαι This man, on one hand, believes that he knows something, while not knowing [anything]. On the other hand, I – equally ignorant – do not believe [that I know anything]. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing ... OK that's weak, but honestly that's how I tend to think (ie. with great cynicism about any assertion) and it serves me alright in general security / non-cryptographic discourse. Basically this approach is treating the PRNG algorithm as a black box, refusing to trust it, and attempting to design a system incorporating the black box along with others claiming the same functionality, based upon that assumption. If this works for any other algorithm - and it seems to - then why not PRNGs? It's not like cryptography has a monopoly as an arbiter of risk. Cryptography is not a silver bullet.)

Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by StavrosK on Saturday July 06, 2013 @01:21PM (#5999388)
It's in the next sentence:

> and the reason is that, when your PRNG's output is provably indistinguishable from true randomness, messing with it will certainly not improve it, and will probably ruin it.