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Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by nknighthb on Saturday July 06, 2013 @04:36AM (#5998340)
> That's true if you combine multiple algorithms conventionally

What I said is true no matter how you combine them, including in the manner you propose.

> flip between supplying the output of each in rapid succession

You've just exposed yourself to a possible related-key attack. Also, the effective entropy of your key could be halved simply by one of the PRNGs being compromised, so even absent a related-key attack, you'd better be using an encryption algorithm with a big key size.

(BTW, it's 100% overhead, not 50% overhead.)

(Oh, and if both algorithms happen to be compromised, the results are or might as well be 0-entropy. Yet again, somewhere along the way you end up trusting something.)

> perhaps the flip in which PRNG is used for the output stream occurs at hard-to-predict points in time

"Hard-to-predict" requires a secure random number generator. You've gone on to describe yet another ad-hoc random number generator that you would use in the construction of your random number generator.

Cryptography is hard.

Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by contingencies on Saturday July 06, 2013 @09:37AM (#5998834)
You've just exposed yourself to a possible related-key attack

It's a tradeoff for mitigating other, perhaps more realistic attack vectors.

the effective entropy of your key could be halved simply by one of the PRNGs being compromised

Halved is a whole lot better than wholly negated, which was the point of the suggestion.

Cryptography is hard.

Yeah.

Architecturally, though, it seems that (dis-)trusting two supposedly PRNG sources is better than all eggs in one basket with one.