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Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by contingencies on Saturday July 06, 2013 @02:38AM (#5998167)
shouldn't be a need to do anything like what you're suggesting, ever, with a valid PRNG

OK, but the point was that if we approach PRNGs like any other element of a secure system, ie. without trust, as the article was suggesting, then combining them in some way may assist with QA on the overall output. (Example: I mean, we don't trust the NSA - but do we trust Schneier? He could be paid handsomely by the NSA as a false stooge and EFF board plant, who are we to know? And if you're an overseas government without a native cryptographic/cryptanalytic tradition, would you trust him? He's a US citizen connected to BT - that's UKUSA - two of the 'five eyes'!)

Similar to how multiple hashing algorithms are often used to preserve overall functional integrity in the case of individual hash function vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to propose collisions.

Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by cdumler on Saturday July 06, 2013 @01:41PM (#5999447)
The difference is between a PRNG and encryption. Encryption's design is to obscure the data stream; thus, if there is a failure in an encryption it is masked by another encryption. Personally, I do not think this is a particularly useful activity. Public vetted encryption rarely spontaneously falls over. A modern encryption, like AES256, is well beyond the far future in computing requirements to brute force. It's better to be aware of changes over time and switch to a current crypto if things change, like how 3DES died. PRNG, on the other hand, is a string of numbers. They don't obscure anything. Either A) you don't try to obscure, and part of your numbers are weak anyways and need to be replaced or B) you're attempting to write your own crypto and you're going to do it badly. Using PRNG to obscure another one is a sin, you're trying to write encryption. (Sin being "to miss the mark" or point.)
Re:The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG – suspected NSA backdoo... by contingencies on Saturday July 06, 2013 @09:53PM (#6000739)
The similarity was drawn to hashing algorithms (which function to produce a message digest or checksum given a message as input), not to cipher algorithms (which perform encryption to ciphertext given one or more keys and a plaintext as input).

A lot of people have responded suggesting there is no way to combine PRNGs to offset the risk of a single PRNG's potential compromise, however I have not seen any citations to this effect and it does really make logical sense to me. Arguments tend to fall back to table-thumping on mathematical proofs, which is a demonstrably naieve way of building a secure system if, for example, your mathematical process, computational platform or side-channel security assumptions are outmoded by an attacker.