Obviously I'm not arguing that Syrians who have access to computers shouldn't get to use crypto, or that there has never been a Syrian who used crypto to aid in protest. But let's not act like crypto's main usage is as righteous as helping a rebellion against an oppressive regime.
You realise that cryptocat isn't marketing itself as a chat client for paedophiles and drug users, but for activists in oppressive regimes, right?
Here's one example from their blog:
> In working with young and middle-aged professionals in the Middle East region, we have discovered that desktop OTR clients suffer from serious usability issues which are sometimes further exacerbated due to language differences and lack of cultural integration (the technology was frequently described as “foreign”). In one case, an activist who was fully trained to use Pidgin-OTR neglected to do so citing usability difficulties, and as a direct consequence encountered a life-threatening situation at the hands of a national military in the Middle East and North Africa region.
That's why people keep talking about the risk from foreign governments - because the cryptocat hype keeps mentioning governments.
> Almost all security/crypto projects are open source. There's no money involved, therefore no corporate sensitivity training or social skills needed. What's needed is secure code to stop governments from rounding up Syrian and Bahraini dissidents and drilling holes into their knees during interrogation because they were duped into trusting cryptocat while planning their democracy protests.