"First, I didn't assign a probability. I said we should be asking questions."
"We should be asking questions about X" is a claim that probabilities are sufficiently high that it's not a complete waste of time to be asking questions about X. You also said it was plausible, which is assigning some bounds on probability. Neither of those were what I was objecting to, however.
I was objecting to what I saw as your rejection of the sort of argument skwirl was making ("This is sufficiently unlikely that it doesn't make sense to be talking about it") in the face of lack of evidence, rather than simple rejection of the particular claim skwirl made (which I reject as well).
Very possible. I think those "ifs" got me again.
>You also said it was plausible, which is assigning some bounds on probability.
A fair enough interpretation, but I was thinking of it in the more subjective sense vs. mathematical.
>I was objecting to what I saw as your rejection of the sort of argument skwirl was making
OK! Understood. LOL! I wasn't objecting to or even addressing whether the sort of argument skwirl was making could ever be valid in any scenario. My point was with regard to this particular discussion. That is, in this context it is not valid to dismiss the need for questions out-of-hand. I tried to be specific and narrow in my explanation.
I think the confusion came in because you broadened what was a very concrete discussion, then began introducing hypotheticals: "well, if you believe this or that, then the other".
I didn't make that turn. Wasn't sure what your position was or what you were attributing to me.
All of this to say, that we appear to be in agreement on the substance. That is, the circumstances merit questions.
But granted, I stand corrected.
I'm aware of the general mode of privileging the hypothesis, though I've never heard that term. I'm not sure that there's anything new or groundbreaking in that post, however. For instance, criminal law is set up to avoid railroading suspects and it's a pretty easily identifiable fallacy, in general.
In any event, your conclusion that I come close to claiming them equally likely rests on its own fallacy. That is, this statement is so general as to be misleading:
"If your mental model assigns the same prior probability to assassination as to car accidents, it's likely broken"
First, I didn't assign a probability. I said we should be asking questions.
But what makes your argument fallacious is that details matter. It is not just any car accident. It is a fiery, one car, high speed accident, under unexplained circumstances. And, he is not just a random person, but a prominent reporter who brought down a powerful person and was working on a "big" story involving, presumably, other powerful people. Ignoring this information, and simply relying on the percentage of the general population who are in car accidents vs assassinated (i.e. relying on the priors) is misguided to say the least.
And while there is a lack of concrete evidence in either direction at this point, the circumstances and information we do have point to the fact that we should be asking questions, not drawing conclusions on any side. Again, that is what my posts are about. Questions.
OTOH, I'm not sure what you are actually trying to say, short of providing an off-topic and somewhat faulty explanation of how we should estimate likliehoods.