https://developer.pidgin.im/wiki/PlainTextPasswords well that's just great.

You can disable storing passwords. If you don’t want to have to enter a ‘master password’ when Pidgin starts up, there is no way they can store the passwords more securely than plaintext.

Get full disk encryption and be happy.

That's simply not true. For example, on Windows, they can use CryptProtectData. Mac OS has a keychain function too. Pidgin devs are being disingenuous by suggesting that accessible to current user is identical to storing plaintext on disk.

Full disk encryption and per-user encryption are good steps. But an accidental backup of Pidgin will still reveal passwords that would be safe if they bothered to use platform specific APIs for such storage.

Pidgin is predominantly developed for Linux, where they would have to support Gnome, KDE and probably at least one other mechanism. Sure, that could be done, but it is a lot of work to do that sensibly on all platforms, and, more importantly, of questionable sense: I would classify the logs of my conversation as much more relevant to a potential attacker than the mere password to my XMPP account.

All of this is true. But when the Pidgin devs state things like "there's no way" and "it's just as secure" (as they do on the wiki), that's just incorrect. An intellectually honest description would note that many platforms offer protection, but it's not standardized across Linux (I'm assuming).

The logs of the conversation can be protected in the same way, so I'm not sure what that has to do with anything. (Although you might wish to keep logs as plaintext, to facilitate backups, if you're not backing up the user's keychain info.)

The wiki explicitly says (under “Is that the final word?”):

> No. The Pidgin developers are generally open to, and would encourage integration with keyrings (KeyringSupport).

and then goes on to state that this is difficult to do, since Pidgin runs on so many different platforms, then stating again that they will happily accept such patches.

However, I find it understandable, that the devs don’t go out of their way to support use-cases they don’t feel necessary to support. On their systems, they trust the filesystem and are happy with that, if others don’t have that level of trust in their computer, that’s fine, but not necessarily their problem.

My point about the logfiles was that to store these in the keyring (rather than a key to the encrypted files) would probably annoy the keyring somewhat (at least the poorer implementations thereof), given that it is intended for use with few-byte passwords and not multi-megabyte logfiles.

The wiki does mention some info, yes. But it also makes a false comparison, noting how you can extract passwords on a system, and implying that the level of security is identical. That's 100% false, and to suggest so is being very misleading.

As far as logs, do what everyone does when you can only store a bit of material: Store your bulk encryption key there.