How to botch TLS forward secrecy

Re:How to botch TLS forward secrecy by bcoates on Friday June 28, 2013 @03:00AM (#5956679)

The only purpose of session resumption is performance, right? I thought someone published a report recently that real-world servers don't get enough successfully resumed sessions for it to even be worthwhile, particularly in a world with crypto hardware, SPDY and HTTP keepalive.

Wouldn't it be easier to just disable TLS resume than to figure out how to do it right?

edit: It was another agl article, https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.h...:

  Since the session information contains key material, 
  it's never cached on disk so the attempted client 
  resume rate, seen by Google, is only 50%.

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Re:How to botch TLS forward secrecy by pfg on Friday June 28, 2013 @03:14AM (#5956713)

That report sounds interesting, got a link by any chance?

I would think that session resumption should greatly increase performance for clients returning to your site, because there's no need to do a complete handshake (which is - relatively speaking - resource-intensive and IIRC also requires more network round-trips).

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