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Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by jmillikin on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @03:33PM (#5948433)
A frustrating problem with ssllabs.com and RC4 is that it appears there is no way to achieve a 100% score. Sites are penalized for supporting RC4 if RC4 is placed above AES-CBC, and penalized as being vulnerable to BEAST if AES-CBC is placed above RC4. If CBC and RC4 are both disabled then no major browser can successfully negotiate a cipher.

The BEAST penalty applies even if the preferred AES-CBC ciphers are defined by TLSv1.2 and thus shouldn't be vulnerable to BEAST.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=john-millikin...

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by ivanr on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @04:09PM (#5948660)
It is actually possible to achieve 100%, but you have to run only TLS 1.2, IIRC. But that would also make your web site inaccessible to most users.

But don't blame us, that's just the current situation with SSL/TLS. We're only reporting it. BTW, we used to show scores in the result, but too many people were trying to game the system (rather than be reasonable). As a result, we're showing only the grades now. In the future, the numerical scoring will be probably removed completely (switching to rule-based scoring).

As for BEAST, our test tests SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifically, but not TLS 1.1+. So, the way to go with BEAST is to force RC4 with TLS 1.0 and earlier, some CBC suite with TLS 1.1, and GCM suites with TLS 1.2.

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by jmillikin on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @04:16PM (#5948709)

  > So, the way to go with BEAST is to force RC4 with TLS
  > 1.0 and earlier, some CBC suite with TLS 1.1, and GCM
  > suites with TLS 1.2.
Since most browsers now include mitigations for BEAST, don't you think that the proven insecurity of RC4 is more dangerous to users than BEAST?
Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by ivanr on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @04:28PM (#5948790)
Both (BEAST and RC4) are proven to be real. The only question is which is worse, and if the attacks are practical. In my view, both are equally unlikely to be a threat for an average web site.

I'd love to get rid of the BEAST penalty, but there are no good (high-volume) stats on what percentage of "all" users is vulnerable to the BEAST attack. Because Apple is not yet deploying 1/n-1 in their browsers, the vulnerable BEAST percentage is still quite high. On SSL Labs, about 15%.

Given that attacks against RC4 are not very practical (yet), one possible direction is to focus on supporting TLS 1.2 (without RC4, obviously), at which point both RC4 and BEAST attacks will become irrelevant.

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by nknighthb on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @05:06PM (#5949054)
> I'd love to get rid of the BEAST penalty

Please don't. The more attention is paid to it, the more ammo I have in pressuring the manufacturers of certain embedded systems I'm stuck dealing with to upgrade their ancient browser codebases.

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by tetrep on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @06:57PM (#5949667)
What's wrong with IE6?
Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by nknighthb on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @08:34PM (#5950000)
Believe it or not, IE6 would actually be a major @#!%ing improvement in one or two cases. At least we'd already know how to work around much of its braindamage.
Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by hiroprot on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @10:38PM (#5950440)
"So, the way to go with BEAST is to force RC4 with TLS 1.0 and earlier, some CBC suite with TLS 1.1, and GCM suites with TLS 1.2."

Is it possible to configure nginx like this? From what I can tell, there is no way to select a cipher based on the protocol.

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by ivanr on Thursday June 27, 2013 @04:06AM (#5951153)
Yes, it's possible. OpenSSL does not allow for per-protocol tuning, but there are some tricks you can use to achieve the same effect. In particular, GCM suites and SHA256/SHA384 suites work only in TLS 1.2, so if you put those first you are effectively prioritizing them on per protocol-basis.

Try this:

AESGCM:SHA384:SHA256:RC4:AES !aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!kEDH:!PSK:!SRP:!kECDH

This is from an example that's not related to PFS, so some tuning may be needed. The example is from my (free) OpenSSL Cookbook, which you can get from here:

https://www.feistyduck.com/books/bulletproof-ssl-tls-and-pki...

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Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by hiroprot on Thursday June 27, 2013 @07:51PM (#5955434)
Thanks, this is helpful. Which CBC suites work in TLS 1.1, but not 1.0?

These are my test results: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=forkly.com

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by ivanr on Friday June 28, 2013 @03:45AM (#5956782)
In general, I don't think the protocol specifications call for some suites to be allowed with certain protocol and some not to. (There are some exceptions, when weak suites need to be deprecated.) In practice, it comes down to how library developers have implemented them. For example, in OpenSSL, you have SSL v2 suites, TLS 1.2 suites, and >= SSL v3 suites. I don't think there are any TLS 1.1-only suites.
Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by hiroprot on Friday June 28, 2013 @01:02PM (#5959043)
Okay, then my current config is probably as good as it gets for now.

Thanks for the help :)

Re:SSL Report: duckduckgo.com by taproot on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @07:48PM (#5949865)
> But that would also make your web site inaccessible to most users.

I call this a feature and part of the sad state of the web. In other words i think that is a point they would like to illustrate. I dont think a 100% score should be possible if it isnt technically correct. Poor compatibility on the browser end isnt really their problem and certinly shouldn't limit scoring.