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Re:SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow by spicyj on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:36PM (#5943576)
If I understand properly, having Google's private key only allows you to do MITM attacks, not to passively decrypt traffic using PFS algorithms.
Re:SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow by graue on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:46PM (#5943841)
Absolutely. This is why PFS protects past sessions, because you can try to decrypt the past, but you can't MITM the past.

But do you think the slightly harder task of running MITM attacks (as opposed to simply siphoning off a copy of the data as it passes) would thwart an entity like the NSA? I really doubt it. PFS or not, a leaked private key means game over for all data transferred after the leak and until that key is replaced.

And that's my point, the reason I made the statement you're replying to: it would still be well worth the NSA's time to crack Google's private key, and PFS doesn't somehow make that scenario not bad. Your statement is correct, but, I argue, not terribly relevant.

(Sorry if this post sounds confused; it's late.)

Re:SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow by mortehu on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @01:26AM (#5944356)
> But do you think the slightly harder task of running MITM attacks (as opposed to simply siphoning off a copy of the data as it passes) would thwart an entity like the NSA?

MITM attacks have the disadvantage that they can be noticed by communicating the session key through a second, more secure, channel, for example one using a client certificate.