By the argumentation on your page, almost none of the electronic data targeted by the data retention directive would in fact be retained if the directive is not also applied to data that merely transit a providers network, given that the vast majority of e-mail addresses in use today are not hosted by "communications providers". If that is indeed an actual loophole, it will be closed quickly if/when everyone realizes that they're not getting the data they expect.
This is in any case a minor point, as in terms of dealing with backup data, it's the two first points of my message that are by far the most serious. And I don't think they're that serious, in that I don't really believe there are any suitable alternatives that are safe enough that you can prevent surveillance based on location, so you'll depend on the crypto, and the combination of the two makes the location of the data rather moot.
What you call a loophole, was no secret in the hearings about the new law. The government wanted this implemented mainly for the phone providers. They understood that foreign email providers like Gmail and Hotmail that most use in Norway, could not be under the law in any practical way, so they restricted who this is applicable to.
I mention this only to point out that without proper security procedures your data privacy policy is irrelevant. Not one-way hashing and salting passwords negates everything else you do.
I'm happy to try again some day but you really have to have airtight security at a minimum to appeal to privacy-conscious users. Password reset is one of the first things we test for any new service.
But I take your point about this and we will try to make that optional. It is optional when you setup email sub-accounts for the administrator.
http://www.lovdata.no/ltavd1/filer/sf-20130514-0484.html#1-2 http://www.lovdata.no/ltavd1/filer/sf-20130514-0484.html#2-6
together states that if you provide email services, you are required to store metadata (which is what the Data Retention Directive is all about).
On a side note, if the secret services cooperate to do massive ingress/egress storage of data on the network level (say for 6 months) -- having easily passable meta-data would help turn that massive data dump into useful information (assuming index and organization around ip/date or something similar).
As for being safe from NSA outside of the US (even with an ally) -- that makes no sense. While it is against Norwegian law to hack into Norwegian businesses - the NSA isn't subject to Norwegian laws, their subject to US law. The secret services are explicitly set up to preform illegal actions in foreign territories (which is why the NSA story is about spying on Americans, rather than on spying in general).
What we dont do is offer "Tilbyder av elektronisk kommunikasjonsnett". That means we are outside. Then the rest is not relevant.
We have been in the courts about this and both Kripos (they wanted information) and the judge found that we are outside the scope of this.
Does indeed sound like the directive is tailor made to make ingress/egress snooping on data useful. The kind of snooping we saw with NSA's "secret rooms". Such illegal wire tapping would fit very well with meta data stored at the ISP level -- and could also explain why anyone not at that level are not required to store meta data (it would be redundant).