Hidden service routing works quite differently that regular exiting traffic. Twice the number of relays are involved, and the traffic is end-to-end encrypted instead of being visible to any relay (such as an exit node). Correlation attacks are always possible to a global passive adversary (which NSA may or may not be), but as far as I can tell, they seem much harder to pull off against hidden services.
AFAIK Silk road just deals in a bit of drugs (relatively low volume too, all things considered).
For intelligence agencies, having evidence (even if inadmissible) of smaller crimes, is just leverage -- and leverage against people that might be able to render useful services (eg: provide deniable assets for framing someone with drugs).
Now, if Silk Road did most of it's trade in weapons grade plutonium, things might be different.
Remember, the whole reason the NSA-thing is a news story, is that it is illegal wire tapping. The feds can't use this for setting up a case.
I've thought the same. But I've also thought that if this is indeed possible, why does Silk Road still exist? Or does this analysis only apply Tor clients connecting to websites, and not Tor hidden services?