They all said stuff about "direct access", without discussing what would and wouldn't qualify as "indirect". They didn't deny doing all kinds of different access that could be called indirect in some way.
http://thenextweb.com/us/2013/06/07/wapost-backtracks-on-cla...;
The last sentence he made, that the government needs to be far more transparent about what they're doing is the only sentence I can really trust as honest, especially given that the alternative to lying could be being thrown into Guantanamo for 'assisting terrorists'.
>"Fisa was broken because it provided privacy protections to people who were not entitled to them," the presentation claimed. "It took a Fisa court order to collect on foreigners overseas who were communicating with other foreigners overseas simply because the government was collecting off a wire in the United States. There were too many email accounts to be practical to seek Fisas for all."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-n...
Another possibility is that the NSA could have served orders on Google employees directly, and they are compelled not to tell their managers about what they did for the NSA.
You hire a foreign national, working for a foreign division of Google to be your spy. Unless every US citizens mail server is domestic, lotta a loopholes to be found.
People should also not assume the credit card statement from their bank is a batch job run on US servers by their bank. I've been told this stuff is outsourced, probably to the lowest bidder. Which if I were an intelligence service, I would be more than happy to subsidize.
You have been told incorrectly. (Source: I work for a major US credit card company.) Certain pieces of the development and maintenance may be outsourced (under the supervision of US employees), but we (and, as far as I know, all our major competitors) own the data centers where they are run.
| they are compelled not to tell their managers
| about what they did for the NSA.
This seems problematic. What if another employee discovers what was done? What if it goes all the way up the chain? When they ask the employee why the created a backdoor, is the employee then obligated to lie? Get fired for the lie? Go to prison while maintaining it's not a NSA secret program?Isn't it more plausible that they're intercepting data flowing in and out of Google servers?
<conspiracy theory> We haven't seen posts from the CEOs of Cisco/Juniper/Dell/HP or other manufacturers of datacenter grade network equipment. Who needs Google/Facebook's "knowledge" if you've got root on all the border network gear (and SSL termination hardware)?
I know here in .au, Huawei have been excluded from the government-deployed National Broadband Network due to suspicions that the Chinese government has too much control/access to Huawei newtwork hardware.
a new time option - Larry is lying because of the gag order.
in between - Larry said "on such scale". Well, Google probably is of a bigger scale than Verizon.
Anyway, once the data is out there, it is only a matter of time and determination for a government (or any financially well backed up player) to get to it.
This scandal will be a great boost for any services involving "crypto", and probably would spring a new ones like an encrypted phone exchange/switch service, where one can see incoming and outcoming phone numbers, yet not which one connected to which :)
These can be installed at the trunk level with virtually no one knowing about it (maybe a couple of on site managers). They can handle massive data and pipe it directly to the NSA. The problem of course is you're dealing with raw data which isn't nearly as easy to work with then if you had direct access to internals.
These are already installed on every major backbone so I also don't see why they would bother to involve anyone, so there must be more to it.
ps. It would be nice if another whistleblower came out with the data on optic splitters and how the NSA uses them.
Access is trivial, volume is a much more interesting problem.
There could be a lot less data leaving than you think.
If you consider that PRISM is not a 'dragnet' but rather an automated system that processes FISA warrants on company premises then the denial wouldn't be wrong. There is no 'scale' that you wouldn't be able to get using regular data requests to internet companies. PRISM could just make the process a lot easier for everyone involved.
So instead of sending a warrant over, having the company verify and send the data to the NSA, then finally transforming the data into a reportable format PRISM automates the whole process.
If you read some of the media descriptions it almost looks like PRISM is more of a data aggregation and portal system that sits on top of a data source and allows analysts to explore content.