Encrypted disks are not meant to protect against attackers that can gain access to the server without rebooting. But all your OS-level security mechanisms (user separation, AppArmor, file permissions, firewalls) become useless if the hosting provider's admin interface has an exploit and the attacker can reboot the machine into single user mode. In other words, the Linode scenario. That's what encrypted disks protect against.
I suppose the sanest middle ground is to wait for the dust of an event like this to settle (or have someone investigate, in case of "just" an unexpected reboot) -- then wipe the server(s) in question, reinstall (hoping the install media is ok) -- and importing the disks/backup.
I still think it is little gain for a lot of work.
Basically if your server software is secure, you've avoided data compromise due to a reboot into single user mode or similar -- but you have to assume (for the sake of guaranteeing the safety of the encrypted data) -- that attackers have a copy of the data at rest (which they can get if the can boot into a recovery image etc.
So now you have to make sure that you can boot a safe environment in which to import the data to, without leaking your key(s).
All the while, it is rather likely there are a few vulnerabilities in your software stack that all this never did mitigate.
I'm not saying don't do it -- I'm in favour of doing it for the (relative) peace of mind that no that will get lost/out as the servers are recycled -- I'm not sure it makes much sense to avoid hackers -- the online threat seems to dominate for most cases I can think of.
Also, if the attackers are able to attack your servers in a similar fashion (gaining access without reboot) -- they have full access to the already decrypted disks (well virtual devices).
As for other comments on automating booting -- as eg cryptsetup allows entering the encryption key via ssh -- automating that shouldn't be too hard.
I still think that it mostly defends against someone stealing/cloning the physical disks though.