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Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by epochwolf on Thursday June 06, 2013 @12:35PM (#5833445)
How does this help? The key is still stored in memory which I assume the hypervisor has access to.
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by FooBarWidget on Thursday June 06, 2013 @12:40PM (#5833481)
Correct, but hacking into the hypervisor is harder than hacking an administration interface. In the end the only secure server is one in a vault at the bottom of the ocean, but there are ways to prevent certain attack vectors.
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by yk on Thursday June 06, 2013 @01:36PM (#5833845)
>In the end the only secure server is one in a vault at the bottom of the ocean[...]

I strongly doubt that:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glomar_Explorer

Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by tbh on Thursday June 06, 2013 @12:41PM (#5833486)
Hetzner provide a lot of physical machines too, I believe this is what the other poster was talking about.
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by FooBarWidget on Thursday June 06, 2013 @12:45PM (#5833511)
Physical machines don't prevent keys from leaking out. A physical attacker can analyze power usage usage patterns to extract the encryption key. :)
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by lawl on Thursday June 06, 2013 @01:01PM (#5833612)
I don't think you have that sidechannel with AES-NI. Besides, as a physical attacker cold boot attack would be much easier Or if the server has any interfaces with DMA, like PCI or something, that's even easier.
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by epochwolf on Thursday June 06, 2013 @01:33PM (#5833821)
Wouldn't that require physical access?
Re:Hetzner Servers Compromised by epochwolf on Thursday June 06, 2013 @01:32PM (#5833816)
Ah, I missed the physical machines. No hypervisor to crack, just out of band management cards. :)