There is a way out of this, and that is a 19th century Catholic idea (I am not even a Christian but Catholicism is interesting to me to the extent the Catholic Church is a torchbearer for pagan Greek and Roman phylosophy) called "subsidiarity."
The idea of subsidiarity is that it is theft for a group to accomplish what an individual could accomplish by him or herself, and for the same reason it is theft for a larger, more centralized group to do what a smaller group could do. The goal of larger groups should be to support, not supplant, smaller organizations. This idea of subsidiarity thus seeks to reformulate society and the economy on Aristotelian grounds, with the family household in the center (rather than the multinational corporation of liberal capitalism, or the state). From this view, virtue and economic value are the same to the extent that people seek to live just lives, and to the extent that central authorities only seek to accomplish on their own what are fundamentally impossible for the smaller entities.
I think this is one reason why libertarians have associated the Catholic idea of subsidiarity with the private sector which only makes sense in terms of Hayek (I don't think that equivalence quite works but one can easily see the similarity).
Hayek isn't trying to build the Ideal World. He's taking the world he saw and said "here's how it works", and then, "here's why it wouldn't work if we decided to design a system instead of having it emerge".
So for example, if subsidiarity is imposed, how does that play out? You already create a requirement to deduce what the smallest group capable of producing a thing is. But we already have something like that in the market. It's lumpy and fuzzy, but it does eventually kill off the too large and the too small (modulo endless tinkering by legislators).
Coase explained that firms emerge because of transaction costs. Sometimes it's easier and cheaper to do a thing in existing groups. Sometimes it's not. The tension between these allows firms to emerge from the social order. I'd add that the rise of IT has enabled coordination on a vastly greater scale, which has helped to create the modern corporation.
I take the approach of saying "what is good is what is conducive to human flourishing." This is largely an Aristotelian approach (and so you can't really accuse me of deriving terms to meet economics). Therefore I would say there is some virtue in entertaining people or rather that such is at least potentially virtuous.
The problem is that if you accept that human flourishing is the goal and thus the definition of virtue, and if you assume that to a large extent this is also the goal of the economy (something I think that both most economists and the Classical philosophers shared), then virtue and value can't be seen as separate at least in terms of solutions (as I say, wages are different).
Or are you saying that Hayek does not see distributive human flourishing as the ends to which our economic systems work?
It's like seeing a purpose in the weather. It just is.
His general point is that trying to make complex, emergent systems fit into neat theories tends to break the systems.
That book I mentioned -- Essence of Hayek -- is worth getting. I began to review it on my blog and never finished writing my follow up ditties.