Behold NSA's own "Mobility Capability" spec
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/Mobility_Capability_Pkg_Vers_2_...
In this spec they define what a mobile device would have to do to be available and good enough to handle government's classified data. How do you know what NSA knows? Usually by looking at what it suggests for government's use. They allegedly know what is already cracked, insecure and exploitable. (For ex. they suggest a specific pattern of erasing hard drives with sensitive data, they might say do it in 3 passes, so maybe assume they can recover data in less than 3 passes, so it gives you a glimpse into what's happening).
So to cut to the chase, how does one hide metadata? Tunneling. You create a device that has some kind of a trusted boot mechanism, loads a trusted OS, and connecst to an exclusive VPN. Nothing enters or leaves the devices via a network that is not _the_ VPN network. Of course in their case the only metadata leaking is that this device is talking to government's central VPN server. Then there are TLS and SRTP channels created that encrypt the voice but metadata is presumably encrypted or hidden by the outer VPN.
Now that is for the government. Now you'd need to set up a a few trusted VPN servers around the world make sure your phone connect to them and all the calls are routed through them as well. That way you could hide the metadata... and probably eventually land on some black list of sorts... ;-) I kid...only slightly
[On a side note there is a known vulnerability in how compressed & encrypted voice data is transmitted that makes it reveal the contents, and that is by analyzing the statistical distribution of data (even encrypted) from that it is possible to deduce the message content -- http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~cwright/oakland08.pdf so, make sure to play relatively loud music in the background , well shit by now I am sure I am on some list somewhere...]
It seems like the better solution would be to just use fixed bitrate compression.
Encrypted content provides you no protection against this sort of analysis.
They are keeping track of meta-data, so they are amassing a huge database of who every American associates with over the phone. This "meta data" is a huge part of Signals Intelligence and is very useful even if you can't hear the call itself (which is not to say they are not recording those as well).
The only way around it would be a TOR like system (or a system running on TOR) to obfuscate who everyone talks to.