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Re:Challenge HN: Break my in-browser crypto for $1000 by tptacek on Wednesday May 29, 2013 @02:33PM (#5788109)
Once Colin noticed he had the wrong nonce value for his CTR mode encryption, he was able to fix it once, tell users to upgrade, and nobody ever had to consider it again.

On the other hand, every single time someone loads your page, the server has the opportunity to surreptitiously add a tiny snippet of Javascript that would fixate the CCM IV your code generates. Nobody would ever notice that, and you could do it selectively (or, more likely, based on a court order).

Re:Challenge HN: Break my in-browser crypto for $1000 by absherwin on Wednesday May 29, 2013 @03:54PM (#5788684)
You're implicitly applying different threat models to browser-downloaded vs. alternatively downloaded code.

If the maintainer of JS code make a mistake and fixes it in future versions, there's no need to worry about it anymore either. However, every time I upgrade I'm just as much at risk from someone attacking either my connection or having attacked the server. So to believe it's more secure, you have to believe those things are easier to do in the context of a web application.