Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
by cinquemb on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:26PM
(#5700469)
That problem is, I think, a showstopper for "anti-circumvention" tools like whatever- the- next- generation- of - Tor will be. Dictatorships have little to lose by backdooring or rootkitting devices; they'll laugh off any outrage stirred up by the discovery of these methods.
Well until something like the DIY Cellphone gets more traction to deal with backdooring/rootkitting: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http:/... (MIT Media Lab)
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
by minimax on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:15PM
(#5700383)
The US government is a special case again. Since most of the companies mentioned here are headquartered in the US, the US government can resort to the no-tech solution of just asking for the data and presenting a subpoena (or so was my experience working for a large US telecom carrier).
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
by tptacek on Monday May 13, 2013 @02:17PM
(#5700405)
The difference is that a subpoena doesn't decrypt an EDH TLS session.
Re:A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
by superuser2 on Monday May 13, 2013 @04:03PM
(#5701072)
But it does decrypt the data at rest.
It could be argued that the scandal in Germany proves even european governments don't have a lot to lose by backdooring devices beyond what the law permits them. Admittedly, the number of backdoored devices was probably low, but the government did seem to act unlawfully.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-b...
But the economics flip around in Europe, Japan, the US, &c: governments there do have something to lose by surreptitiously backdooring huge numbers of devices, and the odds are good that any efforts to do so will be detected (the state of the art for reverse engineering now includes decapsulation and imaging of electronics packages).