This is the problem with public key pinning. The site is still vulnerable to a compromise from its own CA, and many sites actually use a number of different CAs for unfortunate reasons. If you check out the list of pins for twitter.com, it's quite large. Still, at least it's not vulnerable to compromise from every CA that exists.
Trevor Perrin and I have been working on something called TACK (http://tack.io) to make all of this easier and more secure. Rather than embedding pin fingerprints into the binaries of web browsers and mobile apps, you can advertise them and update them via a TLS extension. What's pinned is also your site's certificate, not the CA's certificate, making the site additionally immune to compromise from its CA (or list of CAs, as it were).
I try and I try to get clients to consider just rolling their own root certificate and eschewing the TLS PKI, but people have an irrational fear of the process of making certificates.
It's like Firmware in VoIP, although VoIP implementations leave something to be desired. In essence they're doing something similar to a checksum on the certificate such that any change to the certificate causes the transaction to fail.
You would have to hard code the new dates in.
I seem to remember their authentication was a combination of your phone number and the IMEI of your handset, which is woeful security through obscurity at best.
Quoting the paragraph, in case my paraphrasing is inaccurate: "What’s depressing is that I could have easily helped them intercept basically all of the traffic they were interested in (except for Twitter – I helped write that TLS code, and I think we did it well). They later told me they’d already gotten a WhatsApp interception prototype working, and were surprised by how easy it was. The bar for most of these apps is pretty low."