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Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by ComputerGuru on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:00PM (#5675772)
Guys, when will it sink through? The technology to protect yourself from wiretapping is in your hands. End-to-end asymmetric encryption has never been more accessible. Explain to your friends and family what PGP is and start using it.

Maybe the NSA has it cracked, maybe not. But the IRS sure doesn't, nor do the FDA, DEA, FCC, FBI, Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft for that matter.

EDIT:

Here's how it works: I run PGP/GPG (GPG is the open source/free version of PGP, they're the same protocol) locally and the first time I use it, it creates two files, a "public key" and a "private key". I post/share my "public key" online (and you assume it's really me sharing it with you - this is important).

   gnupg --gen-key
   gpg --armor --output Desktop/mqudsi.asc --export "Mahmoud Al-Qudsi"
For example, here is my public key: http://neosmart.net/downloads/miscellania/mqudsi.asc

Anyone can now use this key to send me a text message encrypted only for me. They just need this file and their own pgp/gpg private key; they tell it to encrypt message X for user with public key Y.

The result of that command (gpg --encrypt --recipient 'Mahmoud Al-Qudsi <[email protected]>' toencrypt.txt) will be encrypted text that no one but the holder of the private key (me) (which should never be shared) will be able to decode.

The result is plaintext. You can send it via email, text message, snail mail, whatever. There are apps that automate the encryption procedure as part of the sending process.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by Groxx on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:49PM (#5676074)
The problem I've had is not so much explaining what PGP is, or why to use it. It's the software.

Sending an encrypted or signed message to someone who doesn't have your keys throws all kinds of scary messages in most email clients. Maybe not a problem for us™, but a huge problem for most people who find they can't send messages to their friends without remembering to do step X for people A, B, and D, but not C or Q. And even if you explained this to them, will they remember a month down the line when their friend calls them because they think their computer got hacked? (true story. nobody reads error messages, and encryption-related ones are among the most cryptic and scary looking.)

Then try convince them to keep using encryption / signatures for you, when it breaks for other people and makes sending an email more complicated, and they have to keep track of who C and Q are. Then try to convince them that, even though they have nothing to hide, encryption is still useful.

Then do this all over again when they get a new computer and forget to install PGP and have already lost their entire keychain.

--

The crypto is here, and yes, it has never been more accessible. The software using it is still garbage.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @04:11PM (#5676575)
>Sending an encrypted or signed message to someone who doesn't have your keys throws all kinds of scary messages in most email clients.

Seriously. The way PGP should work is: Whenever you send an email, it puts a header in the outgoing message with your public key. The header is not normally shown to the user and is ignored as unknown by non-compliant email clients. Then, whenever you send a message to anyone you've ever received an email from, you already have their public key, so your email client automatically encrypts the message before sending it, and their client decrypts any message it receives encrypted.

This is obviously ignoring a whole bunch of problems. What happens if your public key changes? What happens if the attacker sends an email from your address to the user? (Presumably in both cases the recipient will get a message complaining that the key has changed, and DKIM and the fact that your email server authenticates you will help with the second.) But here's the thing: Those problems don't happen normally. The average user doesn't encounter them in the first six months of using the software. They just install a client that supports the protocol and automatically get encryption for messages exchanged with anyone else using a supported client, without having to do anything special.

I think this is one of those "the perfect is the enemy of the good" scenarios. The people who want encrypted email want it to be secure against the NSA coordinating with AT&T and your email provider. Which would be great, if it didn't make the UX so terrible that no one uses it and causes everyone to default to no encryption. Do the above and you still have good security if you verify public key fingerprints manually, but it makes the process of encrypting your email as simple as installing the software, and if you don't verify keys then you're still safer against a large variety of attacks than the primary alternative of not using any encryption at all.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by kbenson on Thursday May 09, 2013 @03:55AM (#5679299)
You forgot the most important part, validating that the public key you've received is actually for that person. That may be as simple as automatically checking public servers for a match and providing some confidence percentage based on how many people signed it or better yet how many people signed based on whether you trust them or not.

Without that, it's not just useless, it's detrimental to the system, as there could be lots of bogus keys accepted by people (imagine a virus that automatically generates and adds a PGP key to mail clients before sending to everyone in the address book, just to make it more likely to pass spam filters). Bogus keys in the web of trust would be a big problem.

In fact, if PGP/GPG were more popular, I imagine there would be the accompanying glut of horrible passwords used (or duplication from easily gleaned passwords), and pretty soon some virus would start automatically signing things it shouldn't on infected systems, and then the web of trust that the system relies on for third party verification wouldn't be so trustworthy.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by AnthonyMouse on Thursday May 09, 2013 @01:30PM (#5681734)
>You forgot the most important part, validating that the public key you've received is actually for that person.

It's not that I forgot that part, it's that that's the hard part. That's the reason PGP is hard to use: They try to make sure you do it securely. And you can't have some third party do that part for you without trusting them, and the whole idea is not to have to trust any third parties. What public servers are you going to use here? Does each email user have to run their own server? Unless you have a single central server, how do you know which server corresponds to which user?

Automating web of trust could be interesting though. Imagine you get an email from a new user that you've never received any email from before. There is some new P2P network where if you have someone's public key, you ask that user whether they know the new user's public key, and they send back a signed response (either "this is the key I have" or "I don't have a key", signed either way with the known user's public key). Then if all your friends who have the new user's key agree on what it is, it's probably right. If nobody has it, you get encouraged to verify it manually (i.e. in person). And if they don't all agree you get the nasty warnings about something fishy going on.

>imagine a virus that automatically generates and adds a PGP key to mail clients before sending to everyone in the address book, just to make it more likely to pass spam filters

That seems like a low-effectiveness method of sending spam, given that the public key is uniquely identifying and tied to a sender address, so once the spam filter realizes everyone is marking all those messages as spam it can just blacklist everything sent using that key. Also, how is it different from existing PGP other than that more people would be using it? If you've infected a machine with a virus you can do whatever you want to it. You could just write the spam directly to the user's inbox, or send it out from their own address and sign it with their actual key. Compromised machine = you're screwed.

>the accompanying glut of horrible passwords used (or duplication from easily gleaned passwords)

This isn't even necessary for a virus. The problem with viruses is that they can stay resident until you type your password and then it doesn't matter how hard the password was.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by kbenson on Thursday May 09, 2013 @02:32PM (#5682153)
> It's not that I forgot that part, it's that that's the hard part. That's the reason PGP is hard to use: They try to make sure you do it securely. And you can't have some third party do that part for you without trusting them, and the whole idea is not to have to trust any third parties. What public servers are you going to use here? Does each email user have to run their own server? Unless you have a single central server, how do you know which server corresponds to which user?

I'm certainly not going to argue with this, it's the basic gist of my original reply. :)

> Automating web of trust could be interesting though. Imagine you get an email from a new user that you've never received any email from before. There is some new P2P network where if you have someone's public key, you ask that user whether they know the new user's public key, and they send back a signed response (either "this is the key I have" or "I don't have a key", signed either way with the known user's public key). Then if all your friends who have the new user's key agree on what it is, it's probably right. If nobody has it, you get encouraged to verify it manually (i.e. in person). And if they don't all agree you get the nasty warnings about something fishy going on.

Exactly. This is similar to what I was envisioning when I was talking about confidence levels. Having different levels such as "I have personally verified (signed)" and "I know of and reasonably trust this key based on people I trust" and making that public in some manner would allow a slew of interesting techniques to verifying public keys to different assurance levels.

Come to think or it, it sounds like what we need is for a social network to adopt this. Google+ with it's real name requirements might make a good fit, but maybe real name isn't what we care about, maybe we just care about email. Alternatively, some alterations to diaspora might work out well (I know little about it other than it's a roll your own social network that I think can work as a node of a larger network).

> That seems like a low-effectiveness method of sending spam, given that the public key is uniquely identifying and tied to a sender address, so once the spam filter realizes everyone is marking all those messages as spam it can just blacklist everything sent using that key. Also, how is it different from existing PGP other than that more people would be using it? If you've infected a machine with a virus you can do whatever you want to it. You could just write the spam directly to the user's inbox, or send it out from their own address and sign it with their actual key. Compromised machine = you're screwed.

I'm imagining a virus that generates one on the infected system for the address the mail client is configured for. That could be a LOT of new keys.

The problem is the thousands or millions of bogus keys that start being sent from addresses that previously didn't have ANY key associated with them (or did, but not through that machine), clog the web of trust if they make it on there. If they are automatically added to mail client/PGP systems on the recipients end, that's a lot of bogus keys in users mail clients (even if it's just the 10% that arrive before spam filters react). If clients end up syncing their known keys to some central repo at some point, that's a LOT of bad data. I can imagine a case where someone generates a legitimate key and gets it personally signed by a few people, only to find that it's verified by hundreds of people on some public servers.

As for low-effectiveness, if it evades more filters by just a few percent, at the scales spam is sent that's a BIG deal.

> This isn't even necessary for a virus. The problem with viruses is that they can stay resident until you type your password and then it doesn't matter how hard the password was.

True. I imagine the really fast spreading and pervasive virus's need to be quicker than that though, but I have nothing other than a hunch to base that on.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by dllthomas on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @08:57PM (#5678151)
I somewhat agree with the "perfect is the enemy of the good" issue here, and would love to see encryption more broadly employed for person-to-person communications, and think your plan is pretty reasonable.

That said, I'm still somewhat worried about MITM in the scenarios you describe above - should probably expose "you haven't verified this sender, it could be spoofed" somewhere, but somewhere icon/color-y rather than scary-error-message-y. Details, though...

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by ComputerGuru on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @04:11PM (#5676574)
It's sad because the technology to implement PGP invisibly when possible fully exists. We were planning on drafting a proposal for behind-the-scenes PGP for email but were shocked to discover it's been fully architectured, designed, and fleshed-out (RFC 2538, RFC 4398), just never implemented.

EDIT:

Can't reply, but anyway, DNSSEC isn't really needed. That's just icing on the cake. What matters is a DNS record that specifies either the keyserver or the actual public keys themselves. A DNS TXT record or a custom PGP record will do just fine.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @04:18PM (#5676633)
Interesting...but seems to require DNSSEC, which is presumably why it hasn't been implemented (because DNSSEC hasn't been widely implemented).
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by Groxx on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @08:45PM (#5678111)
for future reference, the 'reply' link is hidden for a while in deeper threads, basically to prevent people from fighting too much, too quickly :) if you click the 'link' link, you can still reply.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by erydo on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @04:01PM (#5676491)
Fundamentally, I agree. I have my entire team set up with PGP keys.

However, there's a huge training burden that needs to be overcome. People don't understand what it is, how it works, how to manage keys, what they can do securely or not, etc.

People complain about the tools, which I agree are insufficient right now for most people's general use—even with e.g. the very nice https://gpgtools.org —but I'm not convinced that's the primary hurdle.

Awareness of the technology is very low. I think it should be taught in public schools, and not as a specialized course but as part of general "life skills". I would love it if someone with a huge, visible platform like Google or Apple would push PGP integration into their tools for general use. Like, why isn't my PGP pubkey a normal field in my G+ profile? Or Facebook?

There are obvious answers there, of course, beyond the obscurity of the technology: if people start PGP-encrypting everything, those content platforms would lose value.

It would be like visiting Google's house to have a private conversation with a friend that Google couldn't hear. You can do it, but what do they get out of it anymore?

I'm not sure what the solutions are here, but I hope someone solves them.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by lifeisstillgood on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:22PM (#5675908)
Really. If I want to send encrypted messages to anyone who is not a developer or sysadmin I have zero chance. Need to negotiate with a recruitment agent over gpg - ha. Want to recieve a job offer that's encrypted. Yup get them all the time.

What's needed is gpg in JavaScript, or a platform specific text input / gpg converter (you know a magnifying glass that hovers over encrypted text and shows the plain text)

Dunno if anyone has made one but till then we have no hope and Bob Hope

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by johtso on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @03:54PM (#5676452)
http://www.mailvelope.com/

"OpenPGP encryption for Webmail"

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by mike-cardwell on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @03:27PM (#5676296)
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by lifeisstillgood on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @05:18PM (#5677030)
It says "aims to" - I could not see a portion where it said "is working". Do you know it's status?

Looks good though, with a dependence on browsers JavaScript vm it must be a nightmare of security

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by mahyarm on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @05:24PM (#5677061)
PGP is a UX travesty. Using clients that have OTR encryption built in is much better. It also gives you forward secrecy, which is missing from PGP.

http://privacy-pc.com/news/changing-threats-to-privacy-moxie... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-JKqJ7gt5yk

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by 6d0debc071 on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @03:56PM (#5676463)
I doubt I could persuade my friends and family to change email clients if there was a decent email client that provided encryption. They're just not that concerned about the government being able to read their mail and would probably be more worried that I was - as it would be seen - becoming paranoid.

Nothing that requires your average user to open a command prompt seems likely to be used outside of the most security conscious of circles.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by pyre on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @09:03PM (#5678169)
PGP or GPG don't require you to open a command prompt. The issue is that there aren't many (or some would argue any) good GUIs.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by nwh on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @10:09PM (#5678373)
The GUI for OSX are quite good really.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by rdl on Thursday May 09, 2013 @03:57AM (#5679302)
In practice, OTR is more useful than PGP and widely more deployed.

HTTPS is less secure in practice (due to just being transport security and lots of intermediaries to attack), but still decent, and fairly widely used.

SSH is still the only cryptographic system which was so well implemented (in all ways, not just the cryptography) that it ended up taking over the entire market, displacing the non-secure options.

People should be building the next ssh, not the next PGP.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by lsc on Thursday May 09, 2013 @04:19AM (#5679350)
>People should be building the next ssh, not the next PGP.

Yeah. I'd like something that simple and secure (where users can use the same private key across sites) for web browsers. X509 client authentication, as far as I can tell, doesn't cut the mustard. Among other problems, it requires trusted certificate authorities, which causes... problems.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by rdl on Thursday May 09, 2013 @05:14AM (#5679459)
there are good reasons to want a unique key per site (avoiding linking across sites), and most of the problems with x509 (aside from it just being lame) are due to UI/UX in browsers, especially legacy desktop browsers, and lack of good support elsewhere. You could even get away without CAs (or where site = CA) for the client cert problem, too.

It's really not an open crypto research problem; it's design and software engineering and entrepreneurship/marketing.

Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by dustingetz on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:41PM (#5676030)
there are some out of band issues. SMS, email, etc are "push" which means I can't stop people from sending me sensitive things unencrypted. Centralized platforms like facebook, while technically opt-in, are so deeply rooted in the younger generation's lives that opting out has unacceptable social consequences for many people.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by loca on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @08:45PM (#5678112)
FWIW, Julian Assange doesn't use email, and he says encrypted email is possibly even worse. http://wikileaks.org/Transcript-Meeting-Assange-Schmidt.html...
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by sev on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:06PM (#5675812)
"Maybe the NSA has it cracked?" I'm actually curious, why do you think they may have?
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by homosaur on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @04:34PM (#5676744)
They almost certainly don't, I'm sure he was just saying that since that's always the accusation amongst the paranoid with consumer encryption.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by pyre on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @06:22PM (#5677361)
The real point is that even if they have, they aren't going to tip their hat to the public (and other countries) by lending the tech to the FBI for some random violation of federal law.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by rpgmaker on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @08:13PM (#5677992)
You should "Show HN" how you managed to get your grandmother to use pgp.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by sixothree on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @06:20PM (#5677348)
The Direct Project is solving this problem for the medical field in America right now. Hopefully the technology will trickle outwards.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by citizens on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:09PM (#5675824)
Can you provide a little more info? Is this just a program you can run?
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by jlgaddis on Thursday May 09, 2013 @11:17AM (#5680849)
Yep, GNU Privacy Guard (a.k.a. GnuPG a.k.a. GPG): http://gnupg.org/
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by rthomas6 on Wednesday May 08, 2013 @02:03PM (#5675789)
This is slightly off topic, but I googled "PGP" as I do when I want to understand something specific better, and found that PGP stands for "Pretty Good Privacy." Ha.
Re:DOJ: We don't need warrants for e-mail, Facebook chats by rscale on Thursday May 09, 2013 @02:30AM (#5679092)
I had a PGP key available on my personal website and on the MIT key server from 1994 through 2008. I also had Mutt configured to handle PGP essentially automatically.

I killed it because in all that time, I received no encrypted messages. The only value I received was that it verified the signatures on a few mailing list posts.

I love the idea of ubiquitous public key encryption, but I think it just has a few too many moving pieces to get traction in it's current incarnation.