I don't need to wager, and can speak with authority based on what I know (which I'd prefer to leave vague). There are two vectors into a Linode's filesystem from the perspective of an internal attacker: having root on the Xen host or gaining a login on the Linode. Knocking over the database and Web server gives you neither unless the person reused their account's password as their root password, in which case it's behind a cryptographic hash and subject to the typical rules there. If you own the database, you do have LISH access which gives you the equivalent of a VGA console; if someone left that console logged in, it's a vector as well.
The only vector HTP would have had in the general case would be bouncing the Linode. It's a fairly sufficient air gap, in a way.
ISTR being able to back up Linode images, migrate them around, and perform some other admin tasks from the web interface. So I still wonder if the "air gap" API is a bit more powerful than simply the ability to request a reboot. But, again, I don't know.
Without knowing what those things are, I'll just take your word for it that none of them could ever possibly be leveraged to compromise a host or guest without unmaskable and permanent messages appearing in the logs.
I wouldn't bet on that.
> There will always be targets but harboring SwiftIRC is probably a malicious-actor magnet.
Isn't that the same logic Everydns/Dyn Inc. used when they censored Wikileaks?
> All it takes is one zero-day, and you will all be hit by one in your career, so cut Linode a little slack.
True dat.