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Re:An open-source fully homomorphic encryption library by tbmbob on Tuesday April 30, 2013 @10:57PM (#5636206)
To build off of the comments below, this attack is foiled by the fact that one message can be encrypted to one of a large number of ciphertexts.

As mentioned below, this is true for ElGamal. It is also true for all other styles of FHE scheme I'm aware of (including Ring-Learning With Errors based schemes, like this one).

In fact, if a message can only encrypt to one of a small number of ciphertexts, even more direct brute force attacks are often possible. For example, many FHE systems publish a public key. In this case, one can just encrypt E(1), E(2), etc oneself.

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