Incidentally, one of my banks by default blocks all use of Maestro (the European debit card system) outside of the Eurozone. You have to activate use of Maestro abroad on a trip by trip basis. One of my other banks automatically blocks credit cards used in the United States unless preceded by cash withdrawal at an ATM.
* Some banks cards were vulnerable due to faulty crypto. The banks phased those cards out.
* Attacks based on a malicious PIN pad logging the PIN code, then feigning a chip error and telling the user to fall back to the magstrip, thus turning to traditional skimming.
I haven't read anything that attacks the chip itself on current cards. Do you have any links?
edit; Just found http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMV#Vulnerabilities
edit2: Wikipedia TL;DR: There are two currently-relevant attacks:
* One lets attackers trick a terminal into initiating a PINless transaction in order to use a stolen card. This information is sent to the issues as part of the authentication, so a bank could deny all PINless chip charges if they wished (I'm not sure what cases this legitimately used in?), plus there's a clear trail that the cardholder isn't liable.
* The latest attack tricks the card into downgrading to an older, plaintext method of transferring the PIN from the terminal to the card, allowing the PIN to be skimmed. I'm not sure how this is useful in recreating the card to steal money.
I haven't been able to find very much on this in a few evenings that I searched for info on it, but from what I've been able to find I'm quite sure that it's possible to do. The chips give a boolean response as to whether the PIN number is correct and lock themselves after 3 attempts. Combined with the knowledge that 6 pins (=6 parallel bits) are used for 4 digit PIN numbers (log(10^4)/log(2)=14bits), you can deduce that it must have at least persistent storage and computational capabilities. A complete Von Neumann machine. This makes it feasible to implement algorithms like RSA and AES (asymmetric and symmetric encryption) on the chips. The POS/ATM then provides power and a connection to the desired bank, and all should be fine.
I don't really think they are that good to connect to the bank directly, but the idea that the chip is capable of this kind of crypto makes me feel better than with magnetic strips.
EMV is a contact system that requires physical metal pins to touch multiple contacts on the top of the chip itself.
What happens is that they clone the magnetic strip, so sometimes that and pin is enough to produce a card that does withdraws.
[0] http://lifehacker.com/5780617/how-to-prevent-yourself-from-o...
And then your card is useless when in a place that only reads the stripe (like, that uses Square)
And afterwards, if the bank knows that it is supposed to be a chip-capable card; and the location (country) is supposed to be chip-capable, then all mag-stripe transactions are rejected even if the "all required information" is correct.
On the other hand, the card doesn't slide all the way in anymore. Just far enough so that it sticks and it can read the contacts, so at least they can't grab all the information on it.
For a longer list, see: https://krebsonsecurity.com/all-about-skimmers/
The one with the keylogger-featuring keypad is what has me most worried, someone could rob me of my card a bit later. Then again, they might as well rob my card and demand the code, having someone else try it while keeping me at gunpoint. Yeah guns are outlawed here, but that doesn't mean they don't have 'em.
Crypto is cool, until you mention physical security. Obligatory: http://xkcd.com/538/